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ARBITRATOR SELECTION & BATSON
INTRODUCTION
The Equal Protection Clause forbids a state actor from excluding
a person from serving on a jury on the basis of his race or sex.' We
shall call this prohibition the Batson principle.2 In this Article, we
consider an expansion of the Batson principle to arbitration
proceedings. Specifically, this Article considers whether or not it
should be permissible for a party to a court-ordered or contractual
arbitration to exercise a peremptory strike against a potential
arbitrator on the basis of the potential arbitrator's race, sex or other
characteristic which would not be a permissible basis for such a
strike of a potential juror in a public court proceeding.
We suspect that this problem is commonplace but generally flies
beneath the radar screen. Two hypothetical scenarios, both of which
are derived from actual cases and in which a disputant uses
discriminatory criteria in selecting an arbitrator, will help us to
illustrate the dimensions of the practices with which we are
concerned. The first scenario involves one party's use of a peremp-
tory challenge to an arbitrator so as to "stack the deck" in the
proceeding to the disadvantage of the other party. More precisely,
it involves discrimination to which one disputant objects and which
is based on the other disputant's desire to exclude any member of a
certain protected group from the arbitration panel. The second
scenario involves a decision by both parties to insist that the
arbitrator or arbitrators be chosen from a protected group. Thus, it
involves discrimination to which both parties to the arbitration have
expressly consented and which is based on a mutual desire to
include a member of a certain protected group on the arbitration
panel. We believe it will be helpful in thinking through the harms
and benefits that might flow from a discriminatory selection of an
arbitrator to keep these scenarios in mind.
' See U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98-99 (1986) (holding that Equal Protection
Clause precludes prosecutor's peremptory challenge on basis of race). For a discussion of the
case law establishing the principle of non-discrimination injury selection, see infra notes 13-
56 and accompanying text (detailing Batson principle).
2004] 1147
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In the first case,3 an employer and an employee, at the start of
their employment relationship, enter into an agreement that they
shall use arbitration to resolve any legal claim that either otherwise
would bring in court against the other. The agreement calls for
arbitration pursuant to the rules of a specified arbitration organiza-
tion. Those rules call for the organization to assign a three-member
panel to arbitrate a dispute. The rules also give to both complainant
and respondent one peremptory strike to remove an assigned
panelist. In the event a party so removes a panelist, the arbitration
organization is then to assign a replacement panelist.
The employee later files a notice of arbitration alleging that the
employer, whose upper management is dominated by Irish Catho-
lics, passed him over for promotion because he is Jewish. The panel
that the organization originally assigns to hear the case consists of
arbitrators named McShea, Ryan, and Rubenstein. The employer
exercises its peremptory strike to remove arbitrator Rubenstein
because it believes he is Jewish. The arbitration organization then
assigns a replacement arbitrator named Callahan to the case. For
ease of discussion, and because the parties did not expressly consent
at the time of the making of the arbitration agreement to the
discriminatory selection of an arbitrator, we shall refer to this
scenario as the Non-Consensual Scenario.4
In the second case, a Jewish man and Jewish woman enter into
a prenuptial agreement providing that any custody dispute that
might arise out of the fracture of their family shall be resolved by a
Beth Din or by other Jewish arbitrators versed in Jewish law and
shall be governed by Jewish religious law respecting child custody.5
' This hypothetical is based on an actual case in which one of the authors served as
counsel for the employer/respondent. The names used are fictional.
' See Smith v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Inc., 233 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing
situation in which party opposing female litigant struck sole female arbitrator from list of
fifteen potential arbitrators provided to parties by American Arbitration Association but in
"purely commercial dispute[ ]" in which neither gender discrimination nor sexual harassment
seemed to be in issue).
5 See Kovacs v. Kovacs, 633 A.2d 425, 437 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (remanding child
support section of arbitration award); Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993) (holding that prior agreements to arbitrate child custody are not enforceable);
Cohen v. Cohen, 600 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that custody disputes
are not subject to arbitration); Agur v. Agur, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772, 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969)
(striking. section of arbitration agreement involving child custody); Rakoszynski v.
1148 [Vol. 38:1145
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Years later, when the then-married couple separates, the husband
seeks to enforce the arbitration agreement. The wife seeks to avoid
arbitration and argues that the agreement violates public policy.
For ease of discussion, and because both parties expressly consented
at the time of the making of the arbitration agreement to the
discriminatory selection of the arbitrators, we shall refer to this case
as the Consensual Scenario.
In this Article, we consider the extent to which an agreement to
discriminate in the selection of an arbitrator should be enforceable
and the extent to which the actual discriminatory selection of an
arbitrator should invalidate a subsequent arbitration award. To
fully consider these questions, we address three broad issues: First,
we consider the extent to which the Equal Protection guarantees of
the Constitution govern discriminatory selection of an arbitrator.
Second, we consider the extent to which public policy considerations
should preclude judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements and
awards affected by discriminatory selection of an arbitrator.
Finally, we consider how best to structure a statute that would
allow an arbitration disputant to challenge the discriminatory
selection of an arbitrator while not unreasonably undermining the
efficiency and finality of arbitrations.
In nearly a century and a quarter of case law, the Supreme Court
has set out the parameters of the principle of non-discrimination in
the context ofjury selection. This jurisprudence frames our analysis
in the context of the discriminatory selection of an arbitrator. We
Rakoazynski, 663 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (holding that prior agreement to
arbitrate child custody will not be upheld); Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (vacating award of child custody due to adverse effects on children); E.
Gary Spitko, Reclaiming the 'Creatures of the State. • Contracting for Child Custody
Decisionmaking in the Best Interests of the Family, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1207 (2000)
(arguing that such arbitration agreements and resulting arbitration awards respecting child
custody should not be subject to "best interest of the child" review but rather should be
reviewed "to ensure that the award does not promote abuse or neglect of the child or subject
the child to a likelihood of harm"). See also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OFFAMILYDISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.06 (2000) (providing that
court should order provisions of visitation and custody agreement to which parents have
agreed at time of hearing unless court finds that agreement was not voluntary or would be
harmful to child); id. § 2.10 (providing that where parents have agreed in parenting plan to
binding arbitration with respect to parental dispute arising thereafter, court should enforce
resulting award with respect to child unless agreement was not voluntary or award would be
harmful to child).
2004] 1149
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begin this Article, therefore, in Part I, with a discussion of the
relevant case law.6
Next, beginning in Part II, this Article contemplates whether this
non-discrimination principle should extend beyond jury selection in
the public courts to prohibit disputants who are participating in an
arbitration from exercising a peremptory strike against a potential
arbitrator on a basis which would be an impermissible ground for
such a strike of a potential juror in a public court proceeding.' Parts
II and III of the Article consider when, if ever, the protections of the
Equal Protection Clause govern participants in an arbitration. More
specifically, Part II sets out the basic framework for testing whether
state action exists.' Part III then applies this framework to the
issue of whether a disputant in an arbitration may properly be
considered a state actor (and, therefore, subject to the constraints
of the Equal Protection Clause) when he exercises a peremptory
challenge to a potential arbitrator in the proceeding.9
Part IV of the Article considers whether an arbitration party
might successfully oppose enforcement of an arbitration award on
public policy grounds where the selection of the arbitrator was
tainted by intentional discrimination that would offend the Batson
principle.' ° This Part further considers the policies that should
inform our model statute relating to the circumstances in which a
court should enforce a contract to participate in an arbitration that
involves the discriminatory selection of an arbitrator or enforce an
arbitration award that involves such a discriminatory selection of an
arbitrator." A critical part of this analysis is a consideration of
whether otherwise impermissibly discriminatory selection criteria
should be permissible in circumstances where all disputants
expressly consent to the discrimination. Such instances arguably
include a contract that calls for each disputant to select a party-
appointed arbitrator and an agreement between disputants jointly
8 See infra notes 13-56 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 57-154 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 57-154 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 155-246 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 247-319 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 320-68 and accompanying text.
1150 [Vol. 38:1145
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to select an arbitrator whom they hope shares a cultural experience
with the disputants.
Finally, in Part V of the Article, we propose state and federal
legislation that would ban in many cases discrimination on the basis
of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, religion, and sexual orienta-
tion in the selection of an arbitrator but would allow such discrimi-
nation in other specified circumstances. 2 In particular, we would
allow discriminatory selection of an arbitrator in cases in which all
disputants expressly consent to the discrimination and in which the
discrimination is pertinent to a material issue in the case. In this
Part, we set out our thoughts on how best to structure a prohibition
on any other discriminatory selection of an arbitrator with a focus
on maintaining the efficiency and finality that arbitration dispu-
tants commonly prize.
I. THE BATSON PRINCIPLE
As noted above, the Equal Protection Clause proscribes discrimi-
nation on the basis of race or sex by a state actor in the selection of
a juror." An understanding of this non-discrimination principle in
juror selection and its basis is a prerequisite to any analysis of
whether a similar proscription should exist in the arbitration
context. In this Part, therefore, we review the Supreme Court
jurisprudence setting out and developing this principle of non-
discrimination in juror selection and the bases for it.
In 1879, the Supreme Court first addressed a criminal defen-
dant's challenge to the State's exclusion of persons from jury service
on account of their race. 4 In Strauder v. West Virginia, a black
criminal defendant challenged a West Virginia statute that provided
for only white men to serve as jurors." In considering whether this
statute violated a black criminal defendant's right to equal protec-
tion, the Court noted that "prejudices often exist against particular
classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and
2 See infra notes 369-404 and accompanying text.
' See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also supra note 2 and accompanying text
(introducing Batson decision).
14 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879).
15 Id. at 304.
20041 1151
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which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons of those
classes the full enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy." 16
Relatedly, the Court concluded that the statute which required a
black man to stand trial before a jury from which the State had
expressly excluded all black persons solely on account of their race
undermined the protective function of trial by jury. 7 The Court
concluded, therefore, that such exclusion violated the black criminal
defendant's right to equal protection of the laws.'8
Strauder involved facial race discrimination in the assembling of
the criminal venire. Eighty-five years after Strauder, in the case of
Swain v. Alabama,9 the Court addressed a challenge to the State's
alleged practice of racial discrimination in the selection ofjurors for
the criminal petit jury from those persons assembled in the venire.20
In Swain, the Court reaffirmed the principle that "a State's
purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of
participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the
Equal Protection Clause."21
Nevertheless, the Court refused to hold that a prosecutor's use of
the State's peremptory strikes to remove jurors on account of their
race in any particular case amounted to a denial of equal
protection. The Court considered at length the nature of peremp-
tory challenges:
The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that
it is one exercised without a reason stated, without
inquiry and without being subject to the court's con-
trol .... It is no less frequently exercised on grounds
normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or
official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality,
16 Id. at 309.
17 Id. at 308-10. The Court labeled the statute's exclusion of black persons from jury
service on account of their race a "brand upon them.. . of their inferiority" and noted that
this State stigmatization would stimulate additional prejudice against black people, which
would impede the quest for equal justice for black people. Id. at 308.
" Id. at 310.
19 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
20 Id. at 202.
2' Id. at 203-04.
2 Id. at 221.
1152 [Vol. 38:1145
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occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury
duty. For the question a prosecutor or defense counsel
must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race or
nationality is in fact partial, but whether one from a
different group is less likely to be.'
In denying the black criminal defendant's claim that the prosecu-
tor's use of peremptory challenges to remove all potential black
jurors on account of their race in the case violated the defendant's
right to equal protection, the Court considered the nature of the
peremptory challenge and reasoned that "[tlo subject the prosecu-
tor's challenge in any particular case to the demands and traditional
standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical
change in the nature and operation of the challenge" and would, in
effect, destroy the peremptory challenge.2 ' The Court held,
therefore, that "[imn the light of the purpose of the peremptory
system and the function it serves in a pluralistic society in connec-
tion with the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that the
Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for
the exercise of his challenges in any given case."2
The Court further held, however, that a criminal defendant
would show an equal protection violation if the defendant could
demonstrate that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges had
resulted in the exclusion of persons from the jury on account of their
race "for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular
case on trial."' To make this showing, the defendant would have to
demonstrate that the prosecutor had used the State's peremptory
challenges against potential jurors of a particular race systemati-
cally in numerous cases "over a period of time." 7
Twenty-one years after Swain, in the case of Batson v. Kentucky,
the Supreme Court overruled Swain with respect to the evidentiary
burden that a criminal defendant must carry when he claims an
equal protection violation based on a prosecutor's use of a peremp-
2 Id. at 220-21.
2 Id. at 221-22.
25 Id. at 222.
28 Id. at 224.
27 Id. at 227.
11532004
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tory challenge or challenges to exclude a member or members of the
claimant's race from the criminal petit jury.2" The Court in Batson
observed that Swain had "placed on defendants a crippling burden
of proof with the result that "prosecutors' peremptory challenges
are now largely immune from constitutional scrutiny."29 The Court
went on to hold that "a defendant may establish a prima facie case
of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on
evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges at the defendant's trial."0 Batson firmly established the
principle that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor
to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the
assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially
to consider the State's case against a black defendant."3 '
In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. ,2 the Supreme Court extended
the Batson standard to proscribe intentional discrimination on the
basis of sex in the exercise of a peremptory challenge.3" The court
subjected peremptory challenges based on sex to a heightened
scrutiny, asking whether such challenges "provide substantial aid
to a litigant's efforts to secure a fair and impartial jury."4 In sum,
the Court held that such challenges do not provide such aid:
2 476 U.S. 79, 80(1986).
29 Id. at 92-93.
'0 Id. at 96.
"I Id. at 89. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,402 (1991), the Supreme Court held that
a criminal defendant may object to the prosecution's use of a peremptory challenge to exclude
a potential juror of a particular race on account of his race, even if the defendant and that
juror do not share the same race. The Court reiterated that the Batson principle serves not
only to protect a defendant from discrimination in the selection of his jury but also to protect
the excluded juror and the community at large. Id. at 406. The Court made clear that a
venireperson has an equal protection right not to be excluded from jury service on account
of his race. Id. at 409. The Court further held that a criminal defendant in such a case had
standing to assert the equal protection claim of the excluded juror in light of (1) the injury
visited upon the criminal defendant himself (relating to the fact that the verdict in the
defendant's case will not be understood to have been "given in accordance with the law by
persons who are fair"); (2) the common interest of the defendant and the excluded juror "in
eliminating racial discrimination from the courtroom"; and (3) the "daunting" barriers to
bringing suit faced by the excluded juror. Id. at 410-15.
511 U.S. 127 (1994).
' Id. at 129.
:' Id. at 137; cf Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (finding that "woman is still
regarded as the center of home and family life" and, for that reason, upholding under rational
basis review Florida statute that gave to women but not to men absolute exemption from jury
service but allowed women to expressly waive their exemption).
1154 [Vol. 38:1145
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"[G]ender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror compe-
tence and impartiality." 5 Moreover, the Court held that truth is no
defense-that is, state actor sex discrimination in juror selection
violates the Equal Protection Clause even if the state actor seeks to
justify such discrimination by reference to a gender stereotype
shown by statistical evidence to have a basis in fact.86
In Batson, in J.E.B., and in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court
has enumerated the harms that it sees as flowing from race and
gender discrimination by the State in juror selection. First, the
criminal defendant is harmed. 7 In general, the jury provides
something of a safeguard for the defendant against arbitrary
government action. 8 But when the defendant is denied a jury
composed of persons who are" 'peers or equals of the person whose
rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his
neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status
in society as that which he holds,' " he is denied "the protection that
a trial by jury is intended to secure," namely protection "against the
arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or judge."39 More specifi-
cally, he suffers an increased risk that the proceeding will be
influenced by the same prejudice that affected the jury selection.4
Second, the excluded juror is harmed." He is harmed first in
that he is denied participation injury service for reasons unrelated
to his competence to serve."2 Moreover, he is harmed also by the
Is J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129.
36 Id. at 139 n.11.
37 See, e.g., id. at 128 (holding that defendant has right to jury selected by
nondisriminatory criteria).
38 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968) (outlining purposes of
including right to jury trial in federal and state constitutions).
'" Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).
40 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140.
41 See, e.g., id. at 128 (holding that potential jurors have equal protection right to fair
selection procedures); Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (finding that juror is discriminated against when
denied service on account of race).
4 Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
2004] 1155
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brand of inferiority placed upon him by the act of discrimination:
The discriminatory act
denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror, and ...
reinvokes a history of exclusion from political participa-
tion. The message it sends to all those in the courtroom,
and all those who may later learn of the discriminatory
act, is that certain individuals, for no reason other than
gender [or race], are presumed unqualified by state
actors to decide important questions upon which reason-
able persons could disagree.4
Third, the community is harmed in two distinct ways." Racially
discriminatory juror selection procedures "undermine public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice"' by giving rise to
the impression that "the 'deck has been stacked' in favor of one side"
through inclusion of a partial jury." Discriminatory juror selection
procedures also perpetuate invidious stereotypes relating to the
abilities of the disfavored group members by ratifying and reinforc-
ing those stereotypes.'" The perpetuation of such stereotypes poses
a grave danger for our society: "If our society is to continue to
progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the
automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and
causes continued hurt and injury.""
In two early 1990's cases, the Supreme Court extended the
Batson principle to the civil litigation context and to a criminal
defendant's use of peremptory challenges. In Edmonson v. Leesville
4 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142.
" See, e.g., id. at 140 ("Discrimination in jury selection... causes harm to ... the
community."); Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (finding that public confidence is undermined by
discriminatory jury selection procedures).
45 Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. See also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992) (noting
that "[slelection procedures that purposefully exclude African-Americans from juries
undermine the public confidence" in fairness of jury system).
48 J.E.B.,511 U.S. at 140. See also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,413 (1991) (MThe verdict
will not be accepted or understood in these terms [as fair and given in accordance with law]
if the jury is chosen by unlawful [discriminatory] means.").
41 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140.
4' Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,630-31 (1991).
1156 [Vol. 38:1145
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 1156 2003-2004
ARBITRATOR SELECTION & BATSON
Concrete Co.,4' and in Georgia v. McCollum,5" the Court held that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits, respectively, a civil litigant
and a criminal defendant from intentionally discriminating on the
basis of race in the exercise of a peremptory challenge. 5' Both cases
raised two similar critical issues: (1) whether, respectively, a civil
litigant's and a criminal defendant's intentional racial discrimina-
tion in the use of a peremptory challenge inflicts the harms the
Court identified in Batson, and (2) whether, respectively, a civil
litigant's and a criminal defendant's intentional racial discrimina-
tion in the use of a peremptory challenge constitutes state action. 52
Concerning this first issue, the Court concluded that "[r] egardless
of who invokes the discriminatory challenge, there can be no doubt
that the harm is the same-in all cases, the juror is subjected to
open and public racial discrimination." 3 Such discrimination, the
Court noted, regardless of its source, not only harms the excluded
juror but also, by undermining public confidence in our system of
justice, harms the community and the integrity of the court
system.5'
Regardless of the harms that racial discrimination in the exercise
of peremptory challenges does inflict, the Equal Protection Clause
does not proscribe such discrimination unless the discrimination
constitutes state action.55 Importantly, in both Edmonson and
McCollum, the Supreme Court also concluded that the discrimina-
tion at issue constituted state action when engaged in by, respec-
tively, a civil litigant and a criminal defendant.5 6 We review the
Court's state action analysis in Edmonson and McCollum in our
discussion below of the state action doctrine as applied to the
discriminatory selection of an arbitrator. We turn now to that topic.
,9 Id. at 614.
60 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
"' McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616.
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 48; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618-19.
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 49; see also Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618-19 ("Indeed,
discrimination on the basis of race in selecting a jury in a civil proceeding harms the excluded
juror no less than discrimination in a criminal trial.").
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 49-50.
Id. at 50; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619.
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 53; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 627.
2004l 1157
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II. IS A DISPUTANT IN AN ARBITRATION A STATE ACTOR WHEN HE
EXERCISES A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE?
The increasing popularity of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR), particularly pre-dispute arbitration agreements, among
employers and businesses has triggered skepticism and concern
among the plaintiffs' employment discrimination bar and consumer
advocates.57 Groups and commentators critical of the use of ADR in
this context often characterize the very advantages of these
mechanisms-their streamlined procedures, speed and confidenti-
ality-as problematic.' Streamlined procedures and speed may
disproportionately impact the party who had less bargaining power
when the initial agreement was negotiated. Confidentiality
suggests surreptitious and underhanded tactics swept under the
rug.59 With little empirical support, critics, particularly of the use
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, began an attack in the mid-
1990s to unseat arbitration as a popular mechanism for dispute
'7 See, e.g., EDWARD BRuNET& CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
THE ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTIVE 22 (1997) (discussing criticism of arbitration in employment
discrimination cases); THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 308 (2d ed. 2000) (noting concern regarding poor reception of
arbitration in consumer context).
Critics of arbitration and other ADR mechanisms argue that the pursuit of procedural
benefits often carries with it dangerous substantive costs. See Harry T. Edwards,Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Panacea orAnathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668,676 (1986) (recommending
that ADR proponents consider the danger of broadening the scope of arbitration to encompass
disputes more properly resolved through adjudication); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith:
Adjudicating Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 494, 544-46 (1986) (noting that
emphasis on ADR's speed and low cost ignores safeguards courts provide). Reynolds Holding,
Rules for Arbitrators Upheld, Stock Exchanges Asked U.S. Judge for Exemption, S.F. CHRON.
Nov. 13, 2002, at A23 (referring to series of stories in which the Chronicle critiqued
mandatory arbitration).
69 Several courts have found that a confidentiality provision in an arbitration agreement
is unconscionable because such provisions favor the repeat participant in the arbitration
process by making it difficult to determine whether the arbitrator or the arbitration process
was biased. Moreover, courts find that the lack of public disclosure of arbitration results may
favor repeat players over individuals. See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151-52 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that district court did not err in finding secrecy provision unconscionable), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 53 (2003); Plaskett v. Bechtel Int'l, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 334, 342-43 (D.V.I.
2003) (finding that confidentiality favors repeat player); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. 111, 236
F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1180-81 (W.D. Wa. 2002) (same); Acorn v. Household Intl, Inc., 211 F.
Supp. 2d 1160, 1171-72 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("The secrecy provisions of the arbitration
agreements both affect the outcomes of individual arbitrations and clearly favor Defen-
dants.").
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resolution among employers and employees and businesses and
consumers.'0 While plaintiffs initially contended that they could not
be compelled to arbitrate statutory claims, repeated failure in that
arena precipitated a redirection of effort. Today, challenges to
arbitration primarily focus on contractual theories, particularly
unconscionability.6 ' Yet arbitration's critics have sought other
means for challenging arbitration clauses and, as a result, have
begun leveling constitutional attacks against arbitration in all its
forms as well as other court-ordered dispute resolution
mechanisms. 2
A necessary prerequisite for constitutional challenges to arbitra-
tion, however, is some theory under which arbitration constitutes
state action, since constitutional prohibitions apply only to state
' See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for
Statutory Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 231, 275 (1990); Margaret A. Jacobs, Woman
Claims Arbiters of Bias are Biased, Too, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at B1. Senator Russell
Feingold also introduced legislation designed to invalidate pre-dispute arbitration agreements
between employers and employees. See S. 2405, 103d Cong., 2d Ses. (1994); H.R. 4981, 103d
Cong., 2d Seas. (1994). The proposed legislation was never enacted.
61 One of the primary modes for challenging arbitration agreements is the use of the
unconscionability doctrine. Courts have been fairly receptive to this challenge, striking down
arbitration agreements as unconscionable where class actions are prohibited, where an
employee must pay an arbitrator's fees or a high filing fee, or where the arbitral process is
skewed in favor of the employer or business. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,
317 F.3d 646, 668-70 (6th Cir. 2003) (invalidating cost-splitting provision of arbitration
agreement); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 1999) (invalidating
arbitration procedures "so skewed" to favor employer); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serve., 105
F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (construing agreement to require employer to pay
arbitrator's fees so as not to be invalid); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.2d 246, 255
(N.Y. 1998) (finding agreement requiring arbitration before ICC to be financially unconsciona-
ble).
62 Commentators agree that court-ordered mediation may not rise to the level of state
action because of the mediator's lack of coercive power to make a decision in the case. See
Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1049 (2000) (positing that since
mediators do not have coercive authority to decide cases, instances in which state action will
be found in mediation are limited); Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-
Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL.
179, 188 n.47 (2002) (citing Reuben); Colleen N. Kotyk, Note, Tearing Down the House:
Weakening the Foundation of Divorce Mediation Brick by Brick, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
277, 293 (1997) (asserting that divorce mediation does not constitute state action).
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action.63 And, at least as an initial matter, it is difficult to see how
agreements between private parties regarding arbitration meet this
threshold requirement. Critics, however, have developed a theory
of state action in the arbitral context to attempt to allow them to
overcome this hurdle, at least with regard to some forms of arbitral
agreements.64
Under this arbitration-as-state-action theory, critics contend that
contractual and court-ordered arbitration give rise to state action
when the courts require parties to participate in arbitration and
enforce subsequently issued arbitration awards.65 If use of private
or court-ordered arbitration is state action, constitutional require-
ments of due process and equal protection must be satisfied. In the
context of this Article, the focus is on whether Batson, which allows
an adversely affected party to level an equal protection challenge
against an opposing party's misuse of a peremptory challenge, can
be applied to the arbitrator selection process.66 Because a finding of
" See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) ("Constitutional
guarantees... do not apply to the actions of private entities."). The Constitution applies to
non-governmental actors in some situations, such as the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
of slavery. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 1.
See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
For example, Jean R. Sternlight makes an argument that mandatory arbitration
involves state action in her article, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers,
and Due Process Concerns, 72 TuLANE L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) [hereinafter Sternlight, Rethinkingl.
In another article, Mandatory BindingArbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669,676 (2001), Sternlight contends that
a plaintiff who signs an arbitration agreement waiving the right to a jury trial on a federal
claim should be permitted to claim a Seventh Amendment violation if the jury waiver was not
knowing, voluntary and intelligent. The issue of whether an arbitration agreement should
be treated as a waiver of the right to a jury trial is beyond the scope of this Article.
6 Batson offers courts little procedural guidance regarding the administration of a
Batson hearing. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,94 (1986) (focusing on elements necessary
to establish prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury selection). Typically, a
Batson challenge must be raised between the time that the parties make their peremptory
strikes and the time that ajury is sworn and the remainder of the panel is discharged. DAVID
HITrNER & ERicJ.R. NICHOLS, 2 BusINEss AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS
§ 29.10 (1998). Courts administering a Batson inquiry will then hold anything from an in
camera hearing to a full evidentiary hearing in which attorneys testify, answering questions
from opposing counsel or the court. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Note, Defense Presence and
Participation: A Procedural Minimum for Batson v. Kentucky Hearings, 99 YALE L.J. 187,
188-89 (1989). The party requesting the hearing must establish a prima facie case that the
opposing party engaged in a pattern of strikes discriminating against prospective jurors on
the basis of their race or gender. Hn'rNER & NICHOLS, supra, § 29.10.
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state action would have significant, and likely adverse, implications
on the continued use of court-ordered and contractual arbitration,
a careful consideration of whether state action is present in
arbitration is necessary.
Although courts have yet to address the Batson question as it
might arise in arbitration, they have addressed the question of
whether judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements rises to the
level of state action. 7 Interestingly, courts and commentators are
deeply divided on the question of whether state action is present in
contractual arbitration. Every federal court considering the
question has concluded that there is no state action present in
contractual arbitration.6 Yet virtually every commentator address-
' See inf-ra note 68 and accompanying text (listing decisions in which courts addressed
question whether arbitration agreements rise to level of state action).
68 See, e.g., Perpetual Sees., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 137-39 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that
requirement of mandatory arbitration is not state action); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts.,
Inc., 167 F.3d 361,368-69 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding no basis to hold that plaintiff was deprived
of her rights due to government action); Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 191
F.3d 198, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding no state action in application or enforcement of
arbitration clause); Lodal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., No. 95-2187,156 F.3d 1230 (Table), 1998 WL
393766, at *6 (6th Cir. June 12, 1998) (finding no state action since state did not compel
arbitration); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1200-02 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding that SEC has not exercised sufficient influence for finding of state action); United
Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Safeway, Inc., No. 98-15148,165 F.3d 918 (Table), 1998
WL 904719, at * 1 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 1998) (finding no state action since private arbitrator was
used); Davis v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1190-92 (11th Cir. 1995) (agreeing that
state action element of due process claims is absent in private arbitration); Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Air Fla. Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833,842 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that arbitration was
private, not state, action); Elmore v. Chi. & Ill. Midland Ry. Co., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir.
1986) (finding that grievance procedure was not turned into government procedure); Dluhos
v. Strasberg, No. 00-CV-3163, 2001 WL 1720272, at *5, 11 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2001) (finding
decision to enforce trademark in arbitration proceedings cannot be state action), affd inpart,
321 F.3d 365,373 (3d Cir. 2003); Century Aluminum v. United Steelworkers, 82 F. Supp. 2d
580, 683 n.4 (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (noting that state action is absent in private arbitration);
Brannon v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins., Co., No. CIV A. 99-3497, 2000 WL 122241, at *5 (E.D. La.
Jan. 31, 2000) (finding no need to consider claim due to lack of state action); Martens v. Smith
Barney, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 134,137-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that insufficient state action was
exercised to trigger constitutional protections); McDonough v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y,
No. 98 Civ. 3921 (BJJ), 1999 WL 731424, at *3 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1999) (finding lack of
state actor); Mantle v. Upper Deck Co., 956 F. Supp. 719, 734-35 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (finding
challenged actions are those of private arbitrators); Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1460, 1465-70 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding that all arguments put
forth for state action fail); Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL
757709, at *10-13 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994) (finding no state action); Cortv. Am. Arbitration
Ass'n, 795 F. Supp. 970,973 (N.D. Ca. 1992) (finding that AAA was not state actor); Austern
v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 716 F. Supp. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y 1989) (discussing claim for
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ing the same issue has concluded that the opposite is true.69 What
accounts for this extraordinary dichotomy is not clear. Perhaps the
muddied waters of the state action doctrine are responsible. More
likely, the commentators interested in this issue, particularly
Professors Reuben and Sternlight, are hopeful that encouraging the
adoption of state action doctrine in arbitration will accomplish
indirectly what has not been accomplished directly-a wholesale
prohibition on the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements
between one-shot and repeat players, such as employers and
employees.7" Courts, by contrast, are enamored with the efficiency
of arbitration and would prefer not to undermine the process
through a finding of state action.
lack of state action); In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 840-41 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (expressing
that bankruptcy court follows Eleventh Circuit law despite disagreement regarding
arbitration as state action).
No state courts have found state action in private contractual arbitration. Only one
state court suggests that a state action finding is possible. See Williams v. O'Connor, 310
N.W.2d 825, 826 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (suggesting state action is possible in statute-created
arbitration panel). One federal district court stated in dicta that it "respectfully doubts that
the rationale for this result set forth in Davis... viz. that an arbitration award involves no
state action-is well founded." Commonwealth Assocs. v. Letsos, 40 F. Supp. 2d 170,177 n.37
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
' See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REv. 81,
109, 112 (1992) (finding that under FAA, UAA, and state legislation, more than mere court
enforcement is involved in arbitration); Kenneth R. Davis, Due Process Right to Judicial
Review of Arbitral Punitive Damages Awards, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 583 (1995) (discussing
rationale for finding state action in some arbitration cases); Jeffery L. Fisher, State Action
and the Enforcement ofCompulsoryArbitrationAgreementsAgainstEmploymentDiscrimina-
tion Claims, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 289, 292-96 (2000) (postulating that text of ADA
and Civil Rights Act of 1991, encouraging arbitration, constitutes state action); Reuben, supra
note 62, at 991 (assessing state action in ADR programs); Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note
65, at 40 (finding state action to extent Congress or courts are imposing preference for
arbitration). But see Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of
Government's Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
529, 559-67 (1994) (analyzing applicability of state action doctrine in arbitral punitive
damages situations).
" See, e.g., Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for
Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 1-10
(1994) (discussing disappointment with decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991), in which Court rejected several of employee's arguments against New
York Stock Exchange arbitration rules); Reuben, supra note 62, at 1032 (asserting that courts
do not scrutinize repeat player/one-shot player agreements carefully enough); Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog
Contract oftthe 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 1017, 1020 (1996) (finding that workers' rights are
threatened by courts' treatment of arbitration).
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This Article will not attempt to address the larger question
Sternlight and Reuben pose, i.e., whether state action is generally
present when courts enforce arbitration agreements and awards.
Instead, it will focus on a different, but potentially problematic,
aspect of arbitration-whether the Supreme Court, applying the
existing state action doctrine, will find that state action is present
when the parties select the arbitrator who will decide their case.
Understanding and then applying the Court's current views about
state action, peremptory challenges and the arbitral process yields
a clear result in the case of contractual arbitration-state action is
not present. With respect to court-ordered arbitration, the answer
is more difficult to glean but nevertheless ultimately clear-even
when the court orders parties to participate in court-ordered
arbitration, the private parties' use of peremptory challenges does
not meet the requirements for state action as the Court has
articulated them.
A. STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court's state action doctrine explains that constitu-
tional protections of individual rights and liberties apply only to the
actions of governmental bodies.71 Unless the person or entity
charged with a constitutional violation is acting on behalf of the
state, no constitutional action against that person or entity can be
maintained." The state action doctrine is important because it
assures the maintenance of the public/private dichotomy that lies at
the very heart of liberal democratic theory.7" In order to maintain
71 See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) (noting that
private parties' actions lie outside scope of Constitution's protection generally).
" See, e.g., id. at 624 (holding that private litigant's exercise of peremptory challenge
invokes formal authority of court and is state action).
73 See, e.g., JOHN LOcKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 44-73 (Thomas P. Peardon
ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1952) (1690) (discussing political and civil society distinction, origins of
political society, ends of political society, and legislative power); Paul Schiff Berman,
Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional
Norms to 'Private" Regulation, 71 U. COW. L. REv. 1263, 1288-89 (2000) (finding that
public/private distinction captures fundamental societal intuition); G. Sidney Buchanan, A
Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for Government Responsibility
(Part 1), 34 HOuS. L. REV. 333, 336 (1997) (finding "myriad of fact situations in which the case
for state responsibility in some form has greater or lesser appealr); Erwin Chemerinsky,
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the dichotomy, the state action doctrine dictates that courts must
carefully consider the implications of extending to nongovernmental
actors constitutional norms designed to limit governmental power.
Proper consideration is essential to ensure that the boundaries
between judicial and legislative authority are maintained,7' that
constitutional norms are not extended so far that they become
liberty-infringing rather than liberty-enhancing, 5 and that federal
governmental authority remains properly circumscribed.76 At the
same time, a state action doctrine is necessary so that private
actors, acting on behalf of the state, do not infringe on or violate the
rights of others.
Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503, 535-36 (1985) (stating that state action
doctrine protects individual liberty and state sovereignty); Sheila S. Kennedy, When is Private
Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO.
MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 203,209 (2001) (acknowledging need for jurisprudence allowing some
private acts to be attributable to government).
' See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982) (stating that court
enforcement of state action transfers authority from legislative to judicial branch, rendering
regulatory framework subject to judicial modification); Costa del Moral v. Servicios Legales
de Puerto Rico, 63 F. Supp. 2d 165, 171-72 (D.P.R. 1999) (finding that "courts must respect
the limits of their own power as directed against state governments and private interests');
Parker v. Clarke, 905 F. Supp. 638,641-42 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (citing Lugar's discussion of reach
of federal law and federal judicial power); Total Television Entm't Corp. v. Chestnut Hill
Village Assocs., 145 F.R.D. 375,378-79 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (discussing state action requirement
and citing Lugar); Smith v. Wood, 649 F. Supp. 901,908 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (citing state action
discussion from Lugar); In re Estate of Johnson, 460 N.Y.S.2d 932,958 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
(Niehoff, J., dissenting) (noting that state action principle requires courts to respect limits of
power), rev'd sub nom. In re Estate of Wilson, 452 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1983).
7' For example, procedural due process requirements that ensure governmental action
is neither arbitrary nor capricious would greatly disrupt the operation of a private business
or dispute resolution system. Chemerinky, supra note 73, at 535-36 (stating that state
action doctrine protects individual liberty by creating zone of conduct that need not comply
with Constitution).
"' See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936 (asserting that adherence to state action requirement
preserves individual freedom and avoids undue imposition of states); Flagg Bros., Inc. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978) (noting that "most rights secured by the Constitution are
protected only against infringement by governments"); Jacksonv. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 349 (1974) (reiterating dichotomy between deprivation by state and deprivation by
private conduct); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,26 (1883) (affirming dichotomy set forth
in Fourteenth Amendment between deprivations by state and by private conduct); Cmty.
Med. Ctr. v. Emergency Med. Servo. ofN.E. Pa., 712 F.2d 878,879 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that
"the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments shield individuals only from government action");
Elam v. Montgomery County, 573 F. Supp. 797, 803 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (noting that only
conduct fairly characterized as state action can violate Fourteenth Amendment);
Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 536 (arguing that limiting constitutional protections to state
action preserves state sovereignty by allowing state to govern private behavior).
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While the theory underlying state action is well-understood,
determining whether an individual is a state actor when he
allegedly violates constitutional rights is not easily predictable. As
numerous commentators have stated, predicting when, and under
what circumstances, state action exists is both one of the more
difficult and important questions confronting the federal courts
today." This section will offer a basic outline of the Court's state
action doctrine as it applies to peremptory challenges and then
apply it to two different types of arbitration: court-ordered and
contractual arbitration. The application of the state action doctrine
in these contexts yields fairly clear results, suggesting that Batson
challenges are not actionable in either form of arbitration.
The threshold inquiry in any case involving a private individual
or entity accused of violating the Fourteenth Amendment is whether
that private entity may be regarded as a state actor." According to
Supreme Court jurisprudence, private conduct becomes state action
in three situations: First, state action exists when the government
becomes excessively entangled with private behavior and encour-
ages or causes the unconstitutional behavior." Second, state action
See Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "StateAction," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69,95 (1967) (stating that state action is "conceptual disaster
area"); Chemerinsky, supra note 73, at 503 (noting controversy over state action test); Ronald
J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-
Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 304 (1995) (applying state
action test is difficult); Reuben, supra note 62, at 990 (noting that state action doctrine is
often controversial); Martin A. Schwartz & Erwin Chemerinsky, Dialogue on State Action, 16
TOURO L. REV. 775, 776 (2000) (discussing problem in determining whether there is state
action when government official is off job); Ware, supra note 69, at 559 (stating that
determining what constitutes state action may be 'the most important problem in American
law"); R. George Wright, State Action and State Responsibility, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 685,
685 (1989) (stating that state action doctrine is conceptual disaster).
78 See Krotoszynski, supra note 77, at 314 (noting that, for there to be state action by
private entity, private entity's behavior must be attributable to state).
" See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,52 (1999) (stating that state
action exists where state "has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must be deemed to be that of the
state"); Blum v. Yaretaky, 457 U.S. 991, 1012 (1982) (holding that state was not responsible
for nursing home decision to transfer patients even though state extensively regulated
nursing homes); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 830 (1982) (holding that there is no
close nexus between private school's personnel decisions and state even though state
extensively regulates school); Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 166 (allowing state to announce
circumstances under which its courts will not interfere with private sale); Jackson, 419 U.S.
at 357 (stating that utility company's exercise of choice allowed by state law does not make
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exists when a private entity performs what is traditionally an
exclusively public function.80 Third, state action exists when the
private actor and the government have a "symbiotic relationship.""l
In the case of court-ordered and contractual arbitration, the only
relevant categories are the first two: entanglement and public
function. 2 Thus, only those two state action tests will be addressed
here.
state action where initiative comes from it and not from state); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970) (noting that state is responsible for discriminatory private act when
state has compelled the act by its laws); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,378 (1967) (stating
that only by considering "on a case-by-case basis can 'nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct [ ] be attributed its true significance' "); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163, 173 (1965) (noting that "where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the
state must have 'significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations' " in order for
there to be state action); Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 311 (4th Cir. 2001) (listing
factors to consider in deciding whether private conduct can fairly be attributed to state);
Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821,828 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that "state compulsion
test" is factor in determining whether there has been state action); DeBauche v. Trani, 191
F.3d 499, 507 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that private activity is not generally state action unless
state has dominated activity).
' See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991) (noting
importance of determining whether actor is performing traditional government function);
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 (stating that question is whether function has been
"traditionally exclusive prerogative of the state"); Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 157 (noting
argument that state had delegated traditional state power); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353 (stating
that supplying utility services is not traditionally exclusive power of state).
81 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
* To establish a symbiotic relationship that turns a private entity into a state actor,
courts engage in a "highly contextual" inquiry that focuses on whether the private entity
receives state subsidies or aid. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 721-25 (emphasizing proper inquiry);
A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA
and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 123 (2000) (citing J.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694,
698 (D. Ariz. 1993)) (noting highly contextual nature of inquiry). In Burton, the Court
emphasized that the correct inquiry involves "sifting facts and weighing circumstances" to
determine if there is a symbiotic relationship. Burton, 365 U.S. at 729. The Court
determined in Burton that the public funds provided to the facility, together with state agency
ownership and operation, created a symbiotic relationship. Id. at 724. Burton was the high
watermark for the symbiotic relationship test. Id. Today, the Court will find symbiotic
relationships only in cases involving direct governmental aid to the alleged state actor. See
JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.4, at 528 (6th ed. 2000) (listing categories
of relationships between private actor and government used in determining whether there
has been state action). In dispute resolution, direct government subsidies to the alleged
wrongdoer, the arbitral litigant, are nonexistent. Even when the government pays the
private third party neutral, application of the symbiotic relationship test would result in a
finding that the arbitrator is a state actor, a fact that this Article concedes. Because no direct
subsidy is provided to the arbitral litigants in court-ordered or contractual arbitration, the
symbiotic relationship test is inapposite.
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1. Entanglement. To determine whether entanglement exists, a
court considers whether there is such a close nexus between the
State and the challenged action that the action may be "fairly
treated as that of the State itself."3 Action taken by private entities
with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state
action. 4 Instead, entanglement may be found if the challenged
activity results from the State's provision of "significant encourage-
ment, either overt or covert.""
The question of whether the nexus is sufficiently close has always
been a fact-intensive inquiry.8" Nevertheless, certain principles
guide Supreme Court jurisprudence. For example, a review of the
cases suggests that the Court is more willing to find state action
when a court must determine a party's skin color in order to
ascertain the correct outcome under a proposed rule."' So, for
instance, as discussed more fully below, enforcement of a private
contract that prevents sales to African-Americans would entail state
action (as it requires the court to ascertain a party's skin color to
know whether the provision was violated), notwithstanding that the
contractual provision itself was the result of choices made by
seemingly private actors.88 By contrast, the Court will not find state
a' Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
(citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351) (holding that state action may be found only if nexus
between state and action exists); Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 166 (finding lack of state action
where state has refused to interfere with private sale); Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 173
(discussing need for state to have involved itself with discrimination); Adickes, 398 U.S. at 170
(noting that state is responsible for discriminatory act of private party when it compelled such
act).
4 Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005 (MThat the state responds to such actions by adjusting benefits
does not render it responsible for such actions."); Fagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164 (emphasizing
that state's acquiescence in private action has not been found to convert that action into state
action); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357 (same).
86 Blum, 459 U.S. at 1004 (citations omitted).
go See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295-96 (stating "no one fact can function as a
necessary condition across the board for finding state action'); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (noting that state action determination is "necessarily fact-bound
inquiry'); Burton, 365 U.S. at 726 (stating that state action finding "can be determined only
in the framework of the peculiar facts or circumstances present"). See also Jackson, 419 U.S.
at 349-50 (deciding whether there has been state action is often difficult); Moose Lodge, 407
U.S. at 172 (stating that deciding if particular discrimination is state action is not an easy
task).
87 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 8-23 (1948).
88 Id.
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action when a party seeks to enforce a facially-neutral law but does
so in a discriminatory manner (e.g., a homeowner who only reports
trespassing when the trespasser is Hispanic), perhaps on the notion
that, because the court is not called upon expressly to participate in
the racial decisionmaking (i.e., the court need not ascertain a party's
skin color to resolve the trespassing complaint), the nexus, and thus
the entanglement, is more attenuated.8 9 Consequently, an impor-
tant factor in assessing the role of state action in arbitration and, in
particular, racially-biased peremptory challenges in arbitration, will
be the determination of the nature of the court's direct involvement
in the racial decisionmaking.
In this section, the Article begins by analyzing the cases that
most clearly elaborate the Court's jurisprudence on the intersection
between race and state action: Shelley v. Kraemer," Bell v. Mary-
land,91 and Evans v. Abney.92 After reconstructing the Court's basic
state action framework in this area, the Article will then more
closely examine those cases that are perhaps the closest factually to
the discriminatory arbitral challenge area, namely those cases in
which the Court has addressed whether a private litigant is a state
actor when he exercises a peremptory challenge to a juror in court.
Finally, this section will examine the application of these entangle-
ment principles to the particular factual scenario that arbitration
presents.
Shelley involved an attempt by landowners to enforce a racially
restrictive covenant to prevent Shelley, an African-American, from
taking possession of property subject to that covenant. 93 The Court
concluded that a court engages in state action and violates the
Fourteenth Amendment when it mandates that private persons
comply with racially restrictive covenants when selling their
property.94 Thus, according to the Court in Shelley, a court is a state
actor when it enforces a contract that requires racial discrimination.
8 Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
91 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
2 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
334 U.S. at 5-6.
Id. at 20.
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Following Shelley, then, a judicial finding of entanglement is more
likely when a court sanctions racial discrimination."
Many commentators worried about Shelley's possible implica-
tions, and according to some commentators, Shelley could be
interpreted to create state action in any contract dispute that
results in court involvement." The Court, perhaps concerned about
the loss of the critical dichotomy between public and private law and
the constitutionalization of contract law, has rejected the invitation
to extend Shelley." Since Shelley, no other case has found state
9 Id.
9 Some commentators caution against an extension of Shelley, fearing the consequences
the constitutionalization of contract law would have on private interaction. See, e.g., Mark
C. Alexander, Attention Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern Shopping Mall, 41
ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 24 (1999) (finding that Court read state action requirement broadly in
Shelley); Francis A. Allen, Remembering Shelley v. Kraemer: Of Public and Private Worlds,
67 WASH. U. L.Q. 709, 711 (1989) (discussing skepticism toward Shelley as constitutional
precedent); Lino A. Graglia, State Action: Constitutional Phoenix, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 777, 788
(1989) (asserting that opinion in Shelley, where court found state action, does not make
sense); Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
473, 474-79 (1962) (including criticism of Shelley decision); Kennedy, supra note 73, at 215
n.78 (calling Shelley controversial because it could be read to allow any court involvement in
private dispute to qualify as state action); Krotoszynski, supra note 77, at 316 (proposing that
under some interpretations of Shelley private disputes will be subject to constitutional
restrictions); Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kramer's Fiftieth Anniversary: 'A Time for
Keeping; A Time for Throwing Away", 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 83-84 (1998) (noting principal
criticism of Shelley: that it would require all private agreements to satisfy constitutional
standards); Steven Siegal, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the Recognition
of Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After Marsh v.
Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461, 501 (1998) (noting that literal, unbound reading
of Shelley could extend to all private transactions enforced by courts).
7 Bell, 378 U.S. at 328 (Black, J., dissenting) (refusing to extend Shelley); Evans, 396
U.S. at 445 ("[Tihe situation presented in this case is also easily distinguishable from that
presented in Shelley*); Davis v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir.
1995) ("[Tlhe holding of Shelley, however, has not been extended beyond the context of race
discrimination."); Jojola v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C-71-900SAW, 1973 WL 158166, *4
(N.D. Cal. 1973) (same); Brunet, supra note 69, at 111 (Shelley limited to its facts). Judicial
decisions that disadvantage racial minorities do not involve state action unless there is some
non-neutral involvement of the court with the private action. Bell, 378 U.S. at 328 (Black,
J., dissenting); Evans, 396 U.S. at 445. Thus, a court can uphold a trespass conviction based
on a private person's decision not to allow racial minorities on his property. Because neither
the state nor the court has "prompted or required" the private person's discriminatory
behavior, state action does not arise. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 82, § 12.3, at 521. By
contrast, in Shelley, the court interfered in a private, non-discriminatory transaction,
mandating a racial distinction in the sale of property. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19.
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action solely on the basis that the court enforced an otherwise
private arrangement.98
Both the Court and commentators have exaggerated Shelley's
influence. If the contract the Court enforced in Shelley had not been
racially restrictive on its face, the argument that applying Shelley
in subsequent cases would constitutionalize contracts might be
viable. Moreover, Shelley is an unusual case that will not likely be
repeated. The decision turned on the finding that the court had to
look at the color of Shelley's skin in order to determine whether to
enforce the contract. Without race as a factor, the enforcement of a
facially neutral covenant would not have been state action.99
The Court's refusal to extend Shelley has resulted in a reluctance
to find state action, even when race discrimination is a consequence
of the private litigants' behavior. For example, in Bell v. Maryland,
the Court considered whether a business owner could use state
trespass laws to prosecute minorities who did not leave his premises
after he refused to serve them.' 0 While the Court vacated the
trespass convictions on other grounds, the dissent, written by
Justice Black, did not find state action because neither the state nor
the court compelled the private person's discriminatory behavior. 101
Although discriminatory enforcement of laws may result from the
private person's actions, the government need not question the
motives of the party seeking relief nor determine the alleged
trespassers' skin color, in order to enforce the law. In other words,
where a private actor utilizes a neutral law in a discriminatory
manner, the Court will not find state action. A majority of the Court
ultimately adopted Justice Black's Bell dissent and found that a
0 See NOWAKETAL., supra note 82, § 12.3, at 521 (discussing Court's failure to extend
Shelley).
99 Unlike other cases involving state exercise of coercive power, the Shelley case involved
a court's enforcement of an covenant that was contrary to the wishes of both parties to the
case and resulted in race discrimination. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19. This element likely added
to the Court's willingness to overturn the lower court decisions. As with the race aspect of
Shelley, this aspect of the case is unusual and unlikely to be repeated.10o 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
101 Id. at 326.
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HeinOnline  -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 1170 2003-2004
ARBITRATOR SELECTION & BATSON
private group or individual's decision to exclude minorities from
one's premises did not amount to state action. 102
Similarly, in Evans v. Abney, 103 the Court considered whether
state action exists when a court permits land to revert to descen-
dants of a Senator who gave land for a public park on the condition
that no members of a racial minority would be allowed in the
park. 10 4 The Court found no state action. 1 5 While the city and park
trustees could not run a park that limited admission based on race,
reversion of the park to the Senator's heirs did not result in
discrimination against black persons.' Instead, it resulted in
discrimination against all people who might have benefitted from
the use of the park.' 7 Thus, the Court held, judicial enforcement of
neutral state property laws is not state action. 108 As in Bell, the
Court did not need to determine any party's skin color in order to
enforce the law. From Bell and Evans evolves the principle, then,
that judicial enforcement of neutral laws that may result in harm
to minority groups does not involve state action unless the court
must expressly participate in racial decisionmaking in order to
resolve the dispute.
As these cases illustrate, the more involved the Court is in
encouraging or sanctioning discriminatory behavior, the more likely
the Court will find state action. Thus, it is not surprising that the
Court viewed judicial oversight of the use of peremptory challenges
to achieve discrimination inside the courtroom as state action. In
two early 1990's cases, the Supreme Court extended the Batson
principle to the civil litigation context 1 9 and to a criminal defen-
dant's use of peremptory challenges." 0 In Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., Inc.," and in Georgia v. McCollum,"2 the Supreme
1" Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (finding no state action where state
does not encourage private club's decision to restrict membership based on race).
103 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
104 Id. at 446.
I d. at 445.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 446.
10* Id. at 447.
109 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 615 (1991).
1" Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44 (1992).
. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
2 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
2004] 1171
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 1171 2003-2004
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
Court applied a two-part inquiry to determine whether the discrimi-
nation at issue constituted state action when engaged in by either
a civil litigant11 s or a criminal defendant. 1 '
First, the Court inquired into "whether the claimed [constitu-
tional] deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or
privilege having its source in state authority."1 5 The Court
concisely answered this question in the affirmative; the Court noted
that the State need not grant any peremptory challenges to a civil
litigant or a criminal defendant but in doing so invites a private
party to help compose a government actor-the jury."" "By their
very nature, peremptory challenges have no significance outside of
a court of law. Their sole purpose is to permit litigants to assist the
government in the selection of an impartial trier of fact.""' The
Court emphasized that without the State's voluntary authorization
of peremptory challenges, the private party would not be able to
engage in the alleged discrimination." 8
Second, the Court inquired into "whether the private party
charged with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a
state actor."" 9 To resolve the latter issue the Court made three
additional inquiries: "(1) 'the extent to which the actor relies on
governmental assistance and benefits'; (2) 'whether the actor is
performing a traditional government function'; and (3) 'whether the
injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of
government authority.' "12 0 With respect to both a civil litigant and
a criminal defendant, the Court answered each of these questions in
the affirmative.
121
The Court reached this conclusion both because of the nature of
jury selection and because of the court's involvement in the jury
"I McCollum, 515 U.S. at 44.
114 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 615.
"s McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939
(1982)); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620.
"0 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620-21.
.. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620.
.. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621.
"' Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 620. See also McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51 (providing similar
language to describe second part of test).
'2 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51 (quoting Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-22).
12' Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 622; McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51-52.
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selection process. State action exists because the court "has not only
made itself a party to the [biased act] but has elected to place its
power, property and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination." 22
In so doing, the government has "create[d] the legal framework
governing the [challenged] conduct" and has in a significant way
"involved itself with invidious discrimination.""2 One proponent of
a broad state action doctrine, Richard Reuben, argues that consid-
ered together, Shelley and Edmonson stand for the proposition that
the court's participation in enforcing an unlawful private arrange-
ment that would "offend the Constitution if committed directly by
the government" is state action; it aggravates the constitutional
injury suffered in a "unique way because of the unique place of the
courts in a democratic government .... In other words, the
court's unique position as an institution integral to our democratic
society imposes on the court an obligation to avoid enforcing
discriminatory arrangements.
Yet this view simply restates what the Court has rejected
repeatedly since deciding Shelley, Bell and Evans-that the court's
involvement in enforcing neutral private arrangements is state
action. Moreover, Edmonson is a much different case than
Shelley." The court's involvement in Edmonson is of a deeper
nature than in Shelley. In Edmonson, the parties are involved in
the creation of the jury, which is "a quintessential governmental
body."'us The jury will interact closely with the judge and will share
decisionmaking functions with thejudge. Permitting discriminatory
jury selection impugns the function of the court system as well as
affirming discriminatory behavior. Thus, the entanglement between
judge and jury is much more intimate than between a judge and
private parties attempting to enforce a contract that results in
discrimination.
' Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624.
r Id. (citations omitted).
"' Reuben, supra note 62, at 1008-09.
" In Edmonson, the Court made this point: "The alleged state action here is a far cry
from that which the Court found, for example, in Shelley v. Kraemer." 500 U.S. at 635.
m Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624; see also McCollum, 505 U.S. at 52 (outlining essential
procedures for jury creation).
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Moreover, the discriminatory conduct in Edmonson took place in
the courtroom itself, following procedures the court articulated. '2 7
That the government permits the discrimination to take place
within a public courtroom, the court reasoned, exacerbates the
injury caused by the discrimination in that it "mars the integrity of
the judicial system and prevents the idea of democratic government
from becoming a reality."' The role of the courts in our democracy
requires that the courts act with institutional integrity when
conducting proceedings. To maintain institutional integrity, a court
must avoid the appearance of engaging in discriminatory behavior.
A court cannot maintain its integrity if it presides over discrimina-
tory action without attempting to prevent it. In addition, presiding
over discriminatory behavior is quite different than using neutral
legal principles to enforce a private contract without inquiring into
the underlying subject matter of the contract. In such a situation,
the court's integrity as an institution capable of applying neutral
laws is not in jeopardy.
Finally, Edmonson is a case that involves significant state
coercion. A juror is in court as a result of the issuance of a sub-
poena."2 If ajuror does not come to court in response to a judicial
request for his presence, he can be held in contempt of court.3 0
Thus, in Edmonson, the State coerces jurors into appearing in court,
subjects them to public examination, compels them to remain and
then permits discrimination against them.1 3 1 State acts of coercion,
where the parties have no alternative to appearing or complying, are
more likely to constitute state action. Coercion, together with race
discrimination, rises to the level of state action.
12 Ednwnson, 500 U.S. at 616.
' Ednonson, 500 U.S. at 628 (citation omitted); see also McCollum, 505 U.S. at 53
("Regardless of who precipitated the jurors' removal, the perception and the reality in a
criminal trial will be that the court has excused jurors based on race, an outcome that will be
attributed to the State.").
12 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1866(b), (g) (2003) (stating that jurors will be summoned to appear
and, if they fail to appear, will be required to come to court and show good cause why they did
not appear or be subject to fine or imprisonment).
13 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4132 (West 2003) (including jurors in group that
can be punished for contempt).
' Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619.
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If Edmonson is understood this way, the Court's subsequent
decision in Georgia v. McCollum ..2 can more easily be explained. In
McCollum, the Court held that state action exists when a criminal
defendant uses a peremptory challenge to strike a juror based on
race."'3 Although it is hard to imagine a less attractive candidate for
state actor than a criminal defendant, the Supreme Court neverthe-
less found state action because the unconstitutional use of the
peremptory challenge to build a state actor in the courtroom was
more problematic than the Shelley Court's enforcement of a racially
discriminatory contract.1 3 '
Shelley, Bell, Evans, and Edmonson provide an appropriate
framework to apply in answering the question of whether a private
litigant's use of a peremptory challenge in arbitration is state action.
While the analysis may change depending on the type of arbitration
at issue, these decisions shed light on the likelihood of a finding of
state action as they establish the parameters a court will use to
analyze peremptory challenges in a private or semi-private arbitral
setting.
2. Public Function. State action exists when a function that is
traditionally an exclusive governmental service is delegated to a
private actor."3 5 Running a political primary3 6 and managing a
town ' are both traditionally exclusive public functions that are, on
occasion, delegated to private entities. When the government
delegates, the question is at what point along the public/private
dichotomy does the entity performing the delegated function become
the state and therefore have to acknowledge and comply with the
Constitution. In evaluating whether an entity is performing a
"public function," a court considers whether the activity is one that
' 505 U.S. at 42.
133 Id.
'3 Id. at 52 (citing Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624) (noting that when court enforces
discriminatory peremptory challenge it "elect[s] to place its power, property and prestige
behind the discrimination").
" See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621-25 (discussing required exercise of power traditionally
reserved to state by private actor).
138 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953).
137 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,509 (1946).
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is traditionally exclusively controlled by the state. 3 In other words,
a private entity or person does not become a state actor simply by
engaging in an activity that the government could perform-state
action attaches only to those functions that the government
traditionally has performed. Even if the private entity performs a
task of extraordinary importance to society, state action cannot be
found under the public function exception unless the action is also
traditionally a function of the state.139
The public function doctrine is relevant to the inquiry here
because the Court used the doctrine in Edmonson.1" To conclude
that jury selection is a public function, the Court explained that jury
selection involves creation of an entirely public entity.' The power
of the jury comes only from the court, which, in turn, receives its
power from the government." 2 As a result, even though selection of
a particular juror may be privately motivated, the creation of the
jury is the creation of a purely governmental body."3 Moreover, the
Court emphasized, the use of a peremptory challenge would be
meaningless outside the court system.'" Thus, the selection of
jurors "represents a unique governmental function," and when
utilized by a private party is "attributable to the government for
purposes of invoking constitutional protections ....
1"8 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) ("W]e have... found
state action present in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively
reserved to the state."); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (concluding that
function involved is not one traditionally exclusively reserved to state); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,842 (1982) (finding question to be not just if private group serves a public
function but also if function has been traditionally exclusive prerogative of state); Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1978) (finding that few public functions traditionally
performed by state have been exclusively reserved to state).
13 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352-53 (noting that public utility is not state actor).
140 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
141 Id. at 624.
142 Id.
143 id.
'44 Id. at 623.
145 Id. at 627. One might argue that Edmonson represents a limited revival of the public
function doctrine because it appears to make a move away from the exclusivity requirement.
Yet, a more likely explanation is that the Court believed the use of the word "exclusive" was
unnecessary because juries are only selected in state controlled fora. Rather than describe
jury selection as an exclusive state function, the Court indicates that it is a unique and
traditional governmental function delegated to private litigants. While it may be that the
Court's omission of the word "exclusive" was intentional and the Court intends to move away
1176 [Vol. 38:1145
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Following Edmonson, the Court applied its public function
analysis in McCollum. 141 In concluding that the criminal defen-
dant's use of a peremptory challenge was state action, the Court
applied the same test it had used in Edmonson.47 The McCollum
case offers further support for the theory that the Court views
creation of a jury as a traditional and exclusive public function.
Although these two cases might suggest that the Court is
enamored with the public function doctrine, the opposite is true. In
the absence of "exclusivity" and tradition, the Court rarely finds
that a private activity is a state action.' The Court's unwillingness
to find state action using the public function doctrine is best
exemplified by its decision in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 49
In that case, the Court firmly established that the public function
doctrine applies only when the function at issue is traditionally an
exclusive public function. 5 ' In Jackson, a customer claimed her due
process rights were violated when the electric utility terminated her
services without notice and a hearing. 5 ' The Court held that no
state action was present even though the state licensed the utility
and had a virtual monopoly on provision of electrical services.' 52
According to the Court, only activities traditionally performed by or
reserved to the state would constitute public functions. "5 Following
Jackson, only the most fundamental and essential services govern-
from exclusivity as a requirement, the opposite explanation, that the Court simply did not
believe it was necessary to describe the jury as exclusive, is more likely correct.
1'4 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51 (1992).
147 Id. at 51.
14" See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (recognizing that
supplying utility services is not traditionally exclusive prerogative of state and refusing to
expand public function doctrine).
149 Id.
10 Id.
" Id. at 347.
1 Id. at 351-52.
16u Id. at 352-53. The Court explicitly declined to extend the public function doctrine to
industries "affected with a public interest." Id. at 354. The Court noted,
[dioctors, optometrists, lawyers, Metropolitan, and Nebbia's upstate New
York grocery selling a quart of milk are all in regulated businesses,
providing arguably essential goods and services, 'affected with a public
interest.' We do not believe that such a status coverts their every action,
absent more, into that of the State.
2004] 1177
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ments offer, which have no private sector counterparts, would seem
to rise to the level of public function.""
III. APPLICATION OF STATE ACTION IN ARBITRATION
Now that the basic framework for testing whether state action
exists is in place, we will consider whether court-ordered and
contractual arbitration rise to the level of state action. Because
court-ordered arbitration involves considerably more state entangle-
ment than contractual arbitration, each form of arbitration will be
discussed separately and evaluated to determine whether state
action is present. Once these two types of arbitration are explained,
we will apply existing jurisprudence on peremptory challenges and
state action to the arbitration context. We will conclude that
litigants exercising peremptory challenges in either court-ordered
or contractual arbitration are not state actors.
A. COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION
Court-ordered arbitration provides for compulsory, non-binding
arbitration in smaller federal civil actions, typically where damages
claimed are less than $150,000.155 For example, in Arizona, a
L4 In Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 (1978), the court held that a creditor's
seizure of a debtor's property pursuant to a state statute was not state action because dispute
resolution between debtors and creditors is not a public function. Although dispute resolution
is traditionally a governmental function, it is not a public function because it is not an
exclusive governmental activity. Id. at 161. Similarly, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830, 842 (1982), the Court concluded that education of maladjusted students is not state
action because it is not an exclusive public function of the state.
'55 As of 1992, 22 of the 94 federal district courts and 33 states offered court-ordered
arbitration. ELIZABETR PLAPiNGER& MARGARET SHAW, CouRTADR: ELEMENT FOR PROGRAM
DESIGN (1992). By 1998, one quarter of federal district courts had created either court-ordered
or voluntary arbitration programs. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Private Justice: The Law of
Alternative Dispute Resolution 4 (2000). The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28
U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1998), requires every federal district court to implement a dispute resolution
program, which may include arbitration, and authorizes the court to create mandatory
mediation programs. Court rules require arbitration in cases ranging from $50,000 to $150,000.
See, e.g., D. ARIZ. CT. R. PRAC. 2.11 (mandating referral to arbitration where case does not exceed
$150,000); N.D. CAL A.D.R. LOC. R. 4-2(bXz) (referring to arbitration where damages sought do
not exceed $150,000); M.D. FLA. Loc. R. 8.02 (referring to arbitration where $150,000 or less
is involved); W.D. MICH. Civ. Loc. R. 16.6(bXi) (setting $100,000 limit); CAL. CIV. P. CODE §
1141.11 (West 2002) (setting amount in controversy limit at $50,000).
1178
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federal district court will mandate referral to arbitration for most
civil cases where the relief sought does not exceed $150,000.15'
Similarly, in the Western District of Michigan, federal courts must
order civil actions to arbitration if the amount in controversy does
not exceed $100,000.117 In some jurisdictions, the court appoints the
arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators from a list the court
created."' In other jurisdictions, the litigants select the
arbitrator.159 The court or the litigants typically pay the arbitrator
fees, ranging from $100 per day to up to $300 per hour. 160 Parties
may or may not be allowed to enter a peremptory challenge.16' The
' D. ARIZ. CT. R. PRAC. 2.11.
167 W.D. MICH. Civ. Loc. R. 16.6(bXi).
18 See, e.g., M.D. GA. CIV. LOC. R. 16.2.2(a), 16.2.4(a) (stating that chief judge certifies
arbitrators, and court administers arbitrator selection process).
' See, e.g., D. ARIZ. CT. R. PRAC. 2.11(d) (stating that parties may select arbitrator); W.D.
MICH. CIV. LOC. R. 16.6(d) (stating that parties may select arbitrator from list court
maintains, or court will appoint arbitrator); W.D. OKL. A.D.R. Cirv. R. 16.3 Supp. 5.3 (stating
that parties may select arbitrators from list supplied by court).
"' In Florida, the court selects either one arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators. FLA.
STAT. ch. 44.103 (2003). Parties pay the arbitrators whose fees may not exceed $200 per day.
FLA. STAT. ch. 44.103(3) (2003). In Arizona, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York,
and the Western District of Michigan federal courts, the courts pay the arbitrator $250 per
day or $250 per case, whichever is greater. D. ARIZ. CT. R. PRAC. 2.11(g); W.D. MICH. CIv.
LOC. R. 16.6(dXiii); E.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 83.10; W.D.N.Y. CIrv. R. 83.10. In New Mexico and the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the federal courts pay
the arbitrator $100 per case. N.M. 2DJUD. DIST. LOC. R. 2-603 § IV(D); E.D. PA. Loc. R. DIv.
P. 63.2.
1"1 In Arizona, for example, parties to an arbitration have ten days after notification of the
arbitrator selected to exercise a peremptory strike. D. ARIZ. CT. R. PRAC. 2.11(dX2). Under
the Arizona federal district court rules, if one side exercises a peremptory strike, the
arbitration clerk will appoint another arbitrator. Id. Only the side not exercising the first
strike may peremptorily challenge the second arbitrator. Id. Each side is limited to one
peremptory challenge per case. Id. See also CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 170.6 (West 2000) (providing
that party may peremptorily challenge arbitrator); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 7002(c) (2002)
(providing for one or three peremptory challenges in voluntary arbitration, depending on the
type of arbitrator); M.D. GA. CiV. LOC. R. 16.2.4(a) (allowing each party to strike one of three
names court clerk submits); ALASKA BAR R. 37(h), 40(f(10) (providing general rules for
peremptory challenges of arbitrators); CAL. CT. R. 1605(a)(3) (stating that each side has ten
days after notification of arbitrators selected by court administrator to reject one name on
list); KY. ST. SUP. CT. R. 3.800(5XBXii), 3.810(5XBXii), 3.815(5XBXii) (stating that each side
has one peremptory strike for, respectively, legal negligence arbitration, legal fee arbitration,
and arbitration between attorneys); N.M. 2D JUD. DIST. LOC. R. 2-603 § IV(CX1)(b) (stating
that after notice of court's arbitrator selection, each party has seven days to peremptorily
strike one arbitrator); CAL. MADERA COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 712 (granting each party right to
disqualify one arbitrator peremptorily).
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hearing may be held either in a courtroom, 162 or in a room in the
courthouse, 163 or outside of the courthouse-in a lawyer's office, for
example.' 6 Within some short period after the arbitration hearing,
the arbitrator issues a written arbitration award that is filed with
the court and served on the parties. 65 That award is entered as a
final judgment unless the losing party requests a trial de novo
shortly after the award is filed. 66
's2 See, e.g., M.D. GA. CIV. LOC. R. 16.2.4(b) (stating that arbitration hearing will be held
in a U.S. courthouse); S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 83.10 (stating that arbitration will be in courthouse);
E.D.N.Y. CIrv. R. 83.10 (stating that arbitration hearing is to be held in courthouse).
" See, e.g., D. ARIZ. CT. R. PRAC. 2.11(iX2) (stating that hearing is to be held in neutral
location or room at a U.S. courthouse); N.D. CAL. A-D.R. LOC. R. 4-5(b) (stating that hearing
may be held in any location including room in federal courthouse if available); E.D. PA. LOC.
R. CIrv. P. 53.2(b) (stating that arbitration will take place in courthouse).
16 See Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76
IOWA L. REV. 889, 900 (1991) (discussing that Northern District of California's court-ordered
arbitration program holds hearings outside courtroom, while Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia's hearings take place in courtroom). In the Western District of Michigan, the hearing may
be held anywhere within the Western District. W.D. MICH. CIv. Loc. R. 16.6(eXii). In New
Mexico, the Northern District of Ohio, and the Northern District of California, the federal
courts permit the arbitrator to select an appropriate time and location for the hearing.
N.M.2DJUD. DIST. Loc. R. 2-603 § 5(BX1); N.D. OHIoLOC. R. 16.7(2)(A); N.D. CAL. A.D.R. LOC.
R. 4-1 to 4-5, 4-12. In Arizona, a neutral location is selected, but if a neutral location cannot
be found, the arbitrator may ask the arbitration clerk for a room at a U.S. Courthouse facility.
ARIZ. DIST. Crv. CT. R. 2.11(iX2).
16 See Paul Nejelski & Andrew S. Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal
Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REV. 787 (1983) ("After hearing the testimony...
the panel renders its decision by promptly filing an award with the clerk.*); see also, e.g., D.
ARIZ. R. Crv. P. 75(a) (giving arbitrator ten days to make award after receipt of objections by
parties); CAL. IMPERIAL COUNTY SUPER. CT. Loc. R. 7.05 (granting arbitrator ten days, or
twenty if there is extension, to make award); M.D. FLA. R. 8.05(a) (granting arbitrator ten
days following hearing to issue award); KY. UNIF. LOC. R. BOONE, CAMPBELL, GALLATIN,
KENTON COUNTIES GEN. CIrv. R. Addendum A(O) (allowing arbitrator fifteen days to file award
with court and mail to parties); MINN. GEN. R. 114.09(dXi) (allotting arbitrator ten days to file
award with court and mail to parties); E.D.N.Y. CIV. R. 83.10(gXl) ('[T]he arbitrator award
shall be filed with the court promptly after the hearing is concluded."); N.C. SUPER. CT.
M.S.C.R. 12(DX1) (granting arbitrator twenty days after end of hearing or after receipt of
post-hearing briefs to render award); PA. PHILADELPHIA COUNTY CIV. P. R. 1300(BX4)
(granting arbitrator twenty-four hours to render decision); S.C. CIR. CT. A.D.R. R. 7(bXl)
(giving arbitrator five business days to write, sign, and serve award to parties and file with
court); E.D. TENN. Loc. R. 16.5(mX4) (providing arbitrator 150 days to hold arbitration
hearing and render opinion).
1w For example, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, either party may seek a trial de
novo within thirty days after the filing of the award. E.D. PA. LOc. R. CIV. P. 63.2(6) (allowing
either party to seek de novo trial within thirty days of filing of award); see also N.D. CAL.
A.D.R. LOC. R. 4-12 (same); D. ARIz. CT. R. PRAC. 2.1(jX4) (same); W.D. MICH. CIrv. LOC. R.
16.6(g)(iii) (same).
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The state action requirement is satisfied when a court enforces
a statute that mandates party participation in court-ordered
arbitration.167 When a court, pursuant to statutory authority, both
compels parties to participate in costly and time-consuming
proceedings regardless of their wishes and regulates the arbitral
process, the actions of the arbitrator during the proceeding satisfy
the state action requirement. But what about the use of peremptory
challenges to achieve a discriminatory objective in arbitrator
selection? Both Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 16' and J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B. 6 9 illuminate this issue because they address
whether a private litigant is a state actor when he peremptorily
challenges a juror for racial or gender discriminatory reasons. 170
Edmonson and J.E.B. were close cases-each decided 6-3 with
particularly strong dissenting opinions in J.E.B. ' Understanding
the Court's reluctance to extend the state action doctrine to cases
involving peremptory challenges, particularly when those challenges
result in discrimination on the basis of gender, sheds light on the
Court's willingness to extend state action into the arbitral context.
In Edmonson, the Court found that a civil litigant is a state actor
when he exercises a peremptory challenge for racially discrimina-
tory reasons because the discriminatory challenge occurred in the
courtroom and harmed the challenged jurors. 172
According to the Court, "the injury caused by the discrimination
is made more severe because the government permits it to occur
within the courthouse itself."7 ' Public access to courtrooms
aggravates this injury by subjecting jurors to public examination
167 Reuben, supra note 62, at 998 ("[Tlhe statutory delegation of the judicial function to
private arbitrators in arbitrations conducted under the FAA and related state laws
transforms the conduct of those private adjudicators into state action .... "); Sternlight,
Rethinking, supra note 65, at 40 ("Where a state or federal entity explicitly requires private
parties to engage in binding arbitration it should be simple to prove state action."); Davis,
supra note 69, at 605 (O[Wjhere the government compels private parties to engage in conduct,
a finding of state action may be justified.').
'6 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
169 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
170 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616; J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 128.
... J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 127; Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 615.
'72 500 U.S. at 624-25, 628.
'73 Id. at 628.
20041 1181
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and scrutiny.174 Moreover, the Court emphasized the unique court-
created nature of peremptory challenges renders them meaningless
outside the court system.175 "Without the direct and indispensable
participation of the judge, who beyond all question is a state actor,
the peremptory challenge system would serve no purpose."176 A
court's implementation of its own legal framework in its own
courtroom to affect involuntary participants in the judicial process
is, therefore, state action.
Throughout the opinion, the Court also emphasized that the
misuse of the peremptory challenge injures the challenged juror. 177
According to the Court, "[ilf peremptory challenges based on race
were permitted, persons could be required by summons to be put at
risk of open and public discrimination as a condition of their
participation in the justice system."7 ' The Court found influential
both that jury participation is compelled and that jurors are
subjected to constraints on their freedom as well as public scrutiny
as part of their jury service. 179 Finally, the court's role in enforcing
a discriminatory peremptory challenge, through which it makes
itself a party to the discriminatory act, was important in finding
state action."0 When the court as an institution appears to suborn
racial discrimination through enforcement of the peremptory
challenge, the case for state action is made.181
The Court was less easily convinced that gender, like race, is an
inappropriate ground upon which to strike a juror. In J.E.B., the
Court held that a peremptory challenge used to achieve gender
discrimination on a jury is unconstitutional state action.' 2 While
the Court spent little energy discussing state action, its ultimate
holding, that Batson applied to gender discrimination, reinforces the
notion that state action is present when a litigant uses peremptory
174 Id.
'7' Id. at 624.
176 Id.
1n Id. at 628.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 624.
'0 Id. at 628.
181 Id.
' J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130 (1994).
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challenges to create a jury.l18 J.E.B. makes clear that the Court
views racial discrimination in jury selection more strongly than
gender or other forms of discrimination and that, while state action
is present in jury selection, it may not so easily extend beyond the
unique nature of the jury selection process. The Court also empha-
sized that extending Batson to gender discrimination (and poten-
tially other forms of discrimination) comes at great cost, both
financial and practical."l 4 According to Justice Scalia in dissent,
"[tihe extension of Batson to sex and almost certainly beyond...
will provide the basis for extensive collateral litigation ....
Justice O'Connor, concurring in J.E.B., and Justice Rehnquist, in a
separate dissent, reiterated concerns about increased costs associ-
ated with Batson challenges.' 8 These concerns, which will only
increase in number if the Court sanctions challenges for alternative
reasons, suggest that the Court is unlikely to extend its state action
doctrine into non-judicial venues.18 7 Moreover, if not all discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges that occur inside a courtroom are state
action,' 8 it is unlikely that a court would find that peremptory
challenges taking place outside the courtroom are state action.
Of course, some arbitration hearings do take place in a courtroom
setting.189 Even inside the courtroom, however, the concerns the
Court articulated in the peremptory challenge cases nevertheless
suggests that peremptory challenges in arbitration may not be
subject to constitutional scrutiny. Edmonson, in particular, seems
to turn on the compulsory nature of jury service and the court's role
as an institution within society. 9 0 Yet arbitrators, unlike jurors, are
'8' Id. at 128.
'84 Id. at 162 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing increasing litigation).
18 Id.
186 Id. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 156 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
187 In J.E.B., Justices Scalia and Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at
127. Both Justices Kennedy and O'Connor filed concurring opinions. Id. Justice O'Connor's
concurrence criticized the Court's decision to constitutionalize jury selection procedures,
emphasizing both the confidential nature of the decision to make a peremptory challenge and
the costs associated with increasing the number of Batson mini-hearings. Id. at 1431.
" See Lege v. N.F. McCall Crews, Inc., 625 So. 2d 185, 189 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting
party's claim that disability discrimination in juror selection is state action).
188 See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (noting that in some jurisdictions, local
rules require arbitration hearings to be held in courtroom or room in courthouse).
190 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,619 (1991).
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not compelled to participate in arbitrations-they may always
decline to serve.'9 1 Moreover, they are not publicly examined or
scrutinized. Arbitrator selection takes place in private and outside
the courtroom setting.192 Typically, a party sends its peremptory
challenges to the court clerk for processing.' 9 Thus, the "rights" of
an arbitrator need not receive protection in the same way a juror's
would.
9 4
Another concern raised in Edmonson, that the court is sanction-
ing the discriminatory behavior when it excuses the juror,' 95 is not
present in arbitration. Unlike juror selection, the judge never sees
the arbitrator list. " The peremptory challenges and selection of the
arbitrator occur through interaction among the parties and the court
clerk.19 7 Thus, the courts' approval of a discriminatory peremptory
challenge inside the courtroom, in front of the public and the jurors,
is more harmful to courts' institutional integrity than a private
peremptory challenge in arbitration.
Nor does Shelley v. Kraemer198 command that an arbitral litigant
who makes a peremptory challenge for improper reasons be labeled
a state actor. Shelley involved judicial enforcement of a facially
191 See 1 LARRY E. EDMONDSON, DOMIK ON COMmERCIALARBITRATION § 24.1 (3d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter EDMONDSON] ("Arbitrators have an unqualified right to resign and cannot be
forced by the courts to continue to serve if they are unwilling to do so.").
i" M.D. FL. R. 8.3(a) (allowing parties to select arbitrator); W.D. MICH. LOC. Civ. R.
16.6(dXii) (same); N.D. CAL. A.D.R. LOC. R. 4-4 (requiring parties to confer and select one
arbitrator from list of ten).
3 E.g., ARiz. CT. R. PROC. 2.11(dX2) (instructing that each party must notify arbitration
clerk within ten days of arbitrator's appointment that it will exercise peremptory strike of
arbitrator); N.D. CAL. A.D.R. LOC. R. 4-4 (stating that each side is entitled to strike two names
from clerk's list often arbitrators and that within ten days of receipt of original list, parties
shall list six names in order of preference and submit them to clerk).
'" While an arbitrator's rights are not prejudiced through the court-ordered arbitrator
selection process, one might argue that the process prejudices the litigant's rights. Although
the litigant is delayed from appearing in court when its case is referred to arbitration, this
delay is only temporary. A losing party may seek a trial de novo if it is displeased with the
arbitrator's decision.
"G Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624.
1"6 See, e.g., M.D. FLA. R. 8.3(a) (instructing that parties or clerk select arbitrator); W.D.
MIc. Loc. Civ. R. 16.6(d)(ii) (stating that parties select arbitrator from certified list and
notify ADR Administrator of selected arbitrator's name); D.N.J. LOCAL CIrv. R. 201.1(eX2)
(providing that clerk selects arbitrator); E.D. PA. Loc. Civ. R. 53.2.4.B (stating that clerk
selects three arbitrators from list of lawyers certified as arbitrators).
197 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
1m 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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discriminatory contract.' 99 In addition, it reversed the parties'
wishes in order to achieve a discriminatory end.200 In the arbitra-
tion setting, a court first learns of an improper challenge when it
reviews an arbitration award rendered by a neutral arbitrator.0 1
While a litigant might argue that an improper arbitrator selection
process tainted the award, neither a hearing transcript nor an
award would reveal evidence to the court regarding the alleged
improprieties. Thus, after taking testimony, a court would have no
alternative but to use existing arbitration law, neutral on its face,
to enforce an arbitration award that is neutral on its face. Even if
enforcement of the award had a discriminatory effect, that effect is
much more like the results in Bell v. Maryland and Evans v. Abney,
where the Court held that judicial enforcement of neutral law was
not state action, than like Shelley, where the court enforced a
facially discriminatory contract. 20 2
The Court's reluctance to extend Batson or Shelley, together with
the absence of the compelling factors present in Edmonson or J.E.B.,
suggest that the Court would be reluctant to find that a private
litigant's exercise of a peremptory challenge for racially discrimina-
tory or other reasons in a court-ordered arbitration would rise to the
'9 Id. at 4.
20 Id. at 20.
201 Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act dramatically limits the extent to which a
litigant in arbitration may appeal an arbitrator's interlocutory orders. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2004).
Section 16 states:
(a) An appeal maybe taken from--(1) an order--4A) refusing a stay of any
action under section 3 of this title, (B) denying a petition under section 4
of this title to order arbitration to proceed, (C) denying an application
under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration, (D) confirming or
denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or (E) modifying,
correcting, or vacating an award; (2) an interlocutory order granting,
continuing, or modifying an injunction against an arbitration that is
subject to this title; or (3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration
that is subject to this title. (b) Except as otherwise provided in section
1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory
order--(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title; (2)
directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title; (3) compelling
arbitration under section 206 of this title; or (4) refusing to enjoin an
arbitration that is subject to this title.
Id. Because arbitration decisions are appealable only if the decision is final, improper
arbitrator selection would not be a basis for an interlocutory appeal. Id.
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 454 (1970); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,333 (1964);
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 6.
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 1185 2003-2004
1186 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1145
level of state action. While the arbitrator's actions in court-ordered
arbitration are state action because the parties are compelled to
participate in the process, the private parties' decisions in arbitrator
selection, taking place outside the courtroom with no compulsion of
the arbitrators, are not.
B. CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION
Contractual arbitration refers to any arrangement whereby
parties agree that a disinterested private party will fashion a
binding determination of a dispute that has arisen between them. 0 3
The parties select the arbitrator who will resolve their case,
typically making the selection after the dispute has arisen.2° ' The
parties' active role in the selection process enables them to choose
an arbitrator who is an expert in the subject matter of the
dispute.0 5 Traditional arbitration also involves flexible procedures.
2 See 1 EDMONDSON, supra note 191, § 1.1 (defining arbitration). A typical statutory
definition of arbitration appears in the Texas arbitration statute which says:
(a) Nonbinding arbitration is a forum in which each party and counsel for
the party present the position of the party before an impartial third party,
who renders a specific award. (b) If the parties stipulate in advance, the
award is binding and is enforceable in the same manner as any contract
obligation.
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.027 (Vernon 1997).
See 1 EDMONDSON, supra note 191, § 24:1 (stating parties may choose arbitrator).
Sometimes the arbitrator who will decide the dispute is named in the contract establishing
arbitration as the dispute resolution mechanism. Id. § 24:1. Other times, parties simply
state that an agency administering arbitration, such as the American Arbitration Association,
will provide a panel of arbitrators from which an arbitrator will be chosen at the time the
dispute arises. Id. § 24:2. Of course, even the latter selection method is, at some level of
generality, one in which the parties select the arbitrator. They have simply elected to assign
their selection powers to an agent.
m See IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 2.6.2 (1994) (stating that
arbitrator is expected to be expert in norms governing resolution of dispute); see also
Alexander v. Gardner.Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (noting that parties select particular
arbitrator "because they trust his knowledge and judgment concerning the demands" and
customs of field from which dispute originates). It may be that in at least some cases, one of
the parties will not want an expert to resolve the dispute. A party who has departed from
industry norms in his performance, for instance, might prefer an arbitrator who is not an
expert in the industry in which the party deals. In litigation, parties theoretically have little
or no direct control over the particular judge who will decide their dispute (although plaintiffs
do, of course, to a large extent, control the forum and thus can direct cases to fora that are
perceived as more beneficial to plaintiffs). In arbitration, by contrast, a party might act
opportunistically by selecting an arbitrator the party considers predisposed to the particular
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The parties may choose the extent to which they wish to be bound
by formal procedural rules and may define their own procedure.0 6
Arbitration proceedings, for instance, need not follow the rules of
evidence and often limit,20 7 or even eliminate, discovery.
2 8
These flexible procedures typically allow arbitration to proceed
more rapidly than traditional courtroom litigation. The time
between hearing and result is also shorter than in litigation because
arbitrators are not required to publish their decisions and usually
do not.209 It is also uncommon to have a transcript of the proceed-
argument the party will advance. In fact, one of us has argued elsewhere that the possibility
of opportunistic behavior in arbitrator selection provides repeat players, with their better
access to historical information and stronger incentives to influence the arbitrator, a decided
advantage in the arbitral forum. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: A Case
Against the Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449,453 (1996).
206 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 433-34
(1988).
2o UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7 (1955). The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act gives
arbitrators the authority to order discovery, unless the parties' agreement indicates
otherwise. UNIF. ARBITRATION AT § 17c (2000).
2m See JOHN S. MuiutAY ET AL., ARBITRATION 217 (1996) (writing that "[another
illustration of the relative informality of arbitration is the sharply limited availability of
discovery, both pre-trial and at the hearing itself'). The Uniform Arbitration Act does not
provide for any form ofpre-trial discovery. In fact, only the arbitrator has the power to order
"discovery"-he may order it if he believes it is necessary to resolve the dispute; parties do
not have a right to compel discovery. Id. at 218 (citing UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 7 (1955)).
It is interesting to note that parties, when given the choice, tend to agree to eliminate or
reduce the amount of discovery, especially in light of the far-ranging discovery that takes
place in most formal judicial proceedings. The question emerges why discovery is so different
in the two systems. That is, why does our formal judicial system allow for such wide-ranging
discovery if it appears that litigants, when left to choose their own rules, opt for less
discovery? There are at least two possible explanations for this deviation between the nature
of discovery in the public and private dispute resolution systems: (1) little or no discovery is
the better rule in cases where parties have an existing relationship (i.e., the typical
arbitration case), while broad ranging discovery is more appropriate in non-relationship based
cases; or (2) the discovery rules enshrined in the federal rules of civil procedure (and therefore
also the civil rules of the vast majority of states) resulted from a process of interest group
capture (i.e., by attorneys interested in increasing fees).
= See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960)
("Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award."); Halligan
v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that arbitrators have no
obligation to explain their award in writing). The American Arbitration Association's
Commercial Arbitration Rules contain a provision requiring that arbitrators provide a written
award to the parties but do not require the arbitrator to explain in writing or otherwise the
reasons underlying that award. American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration
Rules and Mediation Procedures (July 1, 2003), available at http:/www.adr.org/index2.1.
jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPaid=37504. See also EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER,
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ings.2 0 Because arbitrators rarely publish their opinions and are
not obligated to follow precedent, an arbitral decision can be
expected within days or weeks following the arbitration hearing.
A party may appeal the arbitrator's decision.211 Yet the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), which governs arbitration procedure,
restricts judicial review of arbitral awards.1 2 The FAA limits the
grounds for refusing to enforce an arbitral award to procedural
irregularities in the arbitral decisionmaking process, as when the
arbitrator acts in excess of his authority.213 A court may not reverse
an arbitral award because the arbitrator misunderstood or misap-
plied the law. 21
4
Contractual arbitration, therefore, is traditionally a private party
arrangement. Court involvement occurs, if at all, prior to the start
of arbitration and after the completion of arbitration. Under the
FAA, a party may obtain a stay of litigation pending an arbitration
pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement.21 5 The FAA also enables
enforcement of an arbitration agreement by authorizing a party to
the agreement to file in federal district court a motion to compel the
other party to arbitrate.2" Finally, the FAA contains provisions for
limited judicial review of arbitral awards, together with provisions
articulating the process for vacation or modification of arbitral
awards.217 The FAA does not provide procedures for interlocutory
appeals of arbitrator decisions prior to, or during the course of, an
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTIVE 324 (1997) (explaining
that only in specialized arbitrations, like labor, international commercial and maritime
arbitrations, do arbitrators write opinions); 1 EDMONDSON, supra note 191, § 34:1 (stating
that parties to arbitration typically set time within which arbitrator must render his award);
MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 205, § 2.6.2, at 2:37 (stating that arbitrators are not required to
provide written opinion with reasons supporting their decisions).
210 JOHN S. MURRAYETAL., PROCESS OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 640
(2d ed. 1996).
21 9 U.S.C. § 10(aXl)-(4) (1992).
212 Id.
213 Id.
314 Id. Federal courts have created additional bases forjudicial review ofarbitral awards.
See, e.g., Halligan, 148 F.3d at 202-03 (applying non-statutory ground for review of arbitral
awards).
2 1 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1992).
Id. § 4 (1992).
21? See id. §§ 10-12 (1992).
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arbitral hearing. Thus, governmental involvement is limited to
judicial enforcement of the arbitration agreement or award.
1. Applying Entanglement Jurisprudence to Contractual Arbitra-
tion. In contractual arbitration, parties exercise peremptory
challenges much the way they do in court-ordered arbitration. The
primary differences are that the parties receive the list of arbitra-
tors from a private organization, such as the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), pay the arbitrators themselves, and hold the
arbitrations far from the courtroom. Private litigants, even if they
discriminate in arbitrator selection, are hardly perfect candidates
for state action.
If the connections between private litigants exercising peremp-
tory challenges in a court-ordered arbitration and the state are
insufficient to create-state action, neither should the less entangled
relationship between private litigants in contractual arbitration and
the courts create state action. Nevertheless, the question of state
action in contractual arbitration is worth discussing because
numerous commentators have argued that state action is present in
contractual arbitration.
Proponents of finding state action in contractual arbitration have
argued that the court's favorable treatment of arbitration is
sufficient to satisfy the state action requirement for entangle-
ment.218 This argument overstates both the extent to which the
federal courts maintain a policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements and misunderstands the entanglement doctrine. In
numerous cases, the Court, and lower federal courts, describe a
"healthy" or "strong" federal policy favoring arbitration.219 This
218 See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 69, at 109-12 ("Without the FAA and its pro-enforcement
judicial interpretation, agreements to arbitrate would be meaningless."); Davis, supra note
69, at 610 (stating that state encouragement of and benefit from arbitration may constitute
state action); Fisher, supra note 69, at 292 (noting Supreme Court recognition that statutes
encouraging private conduct can represent state action); Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note
65, at 43 ("[T]he creation of an elaborate state enforcement mechanism, deliberately designed
to allow enforcement of private agreements, does constitute state action."). See also FDIC v.
Air Fla. Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842-43 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding FAA's affect on arbitration
insufficient to create state action).
" See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(stating that FAA manifests "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements"); see also,
e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (citing Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp.); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (finding that
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"policy" does not encourage parties to agree to arbitrate. Instead,
judicial reiteration of the policy simply assures parties that the
court will enforce their contract on the same basis as it would
enforce any other contract.220
Judicial reiteration of a pro-arbitration policy was necessary
initially because federal courts were quite hostile toward arbitra-
tion.2 21 In fact, until the early 1970s, federal courts clearly viewed
arbitration of statutory claims with disfavor. 222 Thus, in part, the
Court restates the policy favoring enforcement to remind parties
that judicial hostility toward arbitration for the resolution of most
claims is at an end. In addition, the policy favoring arbitration
agreement enforcement is not a policy favoring arbitration but
rather a policy favoring enforcement of contracts.223 The Court
strongly believes in freedom of contract and reminds parties of that
fact in cases involving arbitration.2 24 As the Court repeatedly states,
FAA was designed to overrule judicial refusal to enforce arbitration agreements); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985) (citing support for
arbitration found in Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp.).
220 In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), the Court emphasized that the entangle-
ment test is satisfied only when the state encourages actual discrimination, not when the
state practice merely facilitates or permits the discriminatory behavior. Id. at 380. Laws
encouraging arbitration do not encourage discrimination, just as a trespass law does not
encourage landowners to exclude persons from their property for racially discriminatory
reasons.
"2 See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (stating that FAA's purpose was to reverse long-
standing judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,219-20 (1985) (concluding that purpose of FAA was to overrule judiciary's
longstanding refusal to enforce arbitration agreements).
2 See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (finding that Securities Act claims
are not arbitrable); Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(determining that agreements to arbitrate future controversies arising under Securities Act
were void).
2u See, e.g., St. Mary's Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Disco Aluminum Prods. Co., 969 F.2d 585, 590
(7th Cir. 1992).
2 Professor Sternlight contends that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA
forces courts to prefer arbitration over litigation in cases where the underlying agreement
involves parties with unequal bargaining power, and she describes these kinds of contracts
as "ambiguous" because she believes that the party with less bargaining power may not have
voluntarily agreed to the terms of the contract. Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 65, at 44-
45. As a result, Steralight claims that judicial enforcement of the FAA is not neutral. Id.
This argument misunderstands the judicial approach to enforcement of contracts involving
parties with unequal bargaining power. Rather than characterize these contracts as
"ambiguous," courts treat contracts between parties with unequal bargaining power as
enforceable and impose on the party challenging the contract the burden of proof to establish
a contract defense, such as unconscionability. This framework for contract enforcement is
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HeinOnline  -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 1190 2003-2004
ARBITRATOR SELECTION & BATSON
the FAA was intended to place arbitration agreements upon "the
same footing as other contracts."22 Finally, the federal policy
favoring arbitration is anything but absolute. Courts hold, for
example, that the federal policy favoring arbitration yields when a
more important federal policy, such as the federal policy in favor of
ensuring that bankruptcy proceedings occur in bankruptcy court,
conflicts. 226 Thus, the Court's pro-arbitration policy is by no means
insurmountable.
Even if the federal policy were as strong as proponents suggest,
it is still merely a statement of policy. It would be a dangerous
precedent to state that every time a court or other governmental
actor announces a federal policy, state action exists when a private
party attempts to carry out that policy. Substantially greater state
action would exist if that were the case. For example, when the
President encourages citizens to provide charitable assistance to
others through religious institutions, under the theory espoused by
proponents of a state action in arbitration theory, a private citizen's
participation in such an endeavor would be state action and a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause (and the Establishment
Clause) if, for example, that action resulted in religious discrimina-
tion. Such an interpretation would undermine the state action
doctrine as a tool for policing the distinction between public and
private action.
identical to the framework the court applies when considering enforcement of an arbitration
agreement. Thus, enforcement of the FAA framework is as neutral as judicial enforcement
of other types of contracts. That no court views the judicial policy favoring enforcement of
contracts under these conditions as state action suggests that the application of the judicial
policy enforcing arbitration agreements is also not state action.
2 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
no See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984) ("Bankruptcy proceedings, however, have long held a special
place in the federal judicial system .... While the sanctity of arbitration is a fundamental
federal concern, it cannot be said to occupy a position of similar importance."); In re Barney's,
Inc., 206 B.R. 336, 343 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that countervailing policy in federal
statute overrides federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements); In re
Spectrum Info. Techs., Inc., 183 B.R. 360,363-64 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing cases where
bankruptcy policy was held to outweigh arbitration policy). Other federal policies outweigh
the federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Allen v. Pacheco,
71 P.3d 375,384 (Colo. 2003) (determining that FAA does not preempt Colorado Health Care
Availability Act, which regulates arbitration clauses in health care contracts); Spitko, supra
note 5, at 1156 (stating that large majority of courts favor judicial resolution of child custody
disputes and do not enforce arbitral awards respecting child custody or visitation).
20041 1191
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 1191 2003-2004
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
Proponents of finding state action in arbitration might also
contend that even if the court's enforcement of an arbitration
agreement does not create state action, a court's enforcement of an
arbitration award is state action if the arbitral process leading up
to the issuance of the award is tainted, as when a party strikes an
arbitrator from the proposed panel of arbitrators for racially
discriminatory reasons. Application of traditional state action
analysis does not, however, mandate a different result.
A court deciding whether state action exists when a party strikes
an arbitrator for racially discriminatory reasons would first consider
whether the applicable law is neutral. Application of the entangle-
ment analysis, exemplified in Bell v. Maryland2 27 and Evans v.
Abney,2" would have the court analyzing whether the enforcement
of a facially neutral arbitration award amounts to state action. A
state action finding would be surprising because, as in Bell and
other cases, the arbitration award is like a contract-the arbitrator
has created terms of a contract whereby one party agrees to do
something for or pay something to the other party. The court's job
is merely to enter the award as an order of the court. Because a
court's review of an arbitration award is, by statute, very limited,
the court plays virtually no role in enforcement of the award. The
review is really a rubber stamp--only in the most egregious cases
involving specific types of procedural irregularities or substantive
mistakes would a court consider reversing an arbitration award.
Opponents might argue that the court's action in turning the
award into a court order, violation of which could be punished by
contempt, creates state action if the underlying arbitral process was
tainted in some way. Yet enforcement of the arbitral award does
not involve condoning racial discrimination. If a party exercised a
peremptory challenge for racially discriminatory reasons, the effect
of the improper challenge would not be evident in the award.
Moreover, even if there was evidence that the ultimate
decisionmaker was biased in some way, state action would still not
be present because the arbitrator in a contractual arbitration is not
n7 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
396 U.S. 435 (1970).
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a state actor. Accordingly, judicial enforcement of the arbitration
award does not create state action.
Moreover, as a practical matter, it is unclear how a party could
challenge the discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge. 229
Interlocutory appeals are unheard of during arbitration-the only
time a court will hear challenges is before the arbitration or after
the award is entered.' 0 The Court, enamored as it is with the
efficiency of the arbitral process, seems unlikely to support
undermining that efficiency by permitting interlocutory appeals
after arbitrator selection or, for that matter, expanded challenges to
arbitration awards. Finally, it is not easy to determine what the
remedy for the misuse of a peremptory challenge should be.231
Could damages be assessed? Would a more appropriate remedy be
an arbitral rehearing? Damages or rehearing would make for an
expensive win for the party against whom the discriminatory
peremptory challenge was used. Given the limited nature of the
harm and that, in a sense, the arbitrator is harmed more than the
party, it seems unlikely that the Court would make actionable the
discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge.
Even if the Court applied Shelley, an analogy between
enforcement of a facially neutral arbitration award and enforcement
of a facially discriminatory provision like the restrictive covenant at
issue in Shelley is difficult to draw. 2 As discussed earlier, the
Court has held that judicial decisions that disadvantage racial
minorities do not involve state action unless the court must
participate in the racial decisionmaking. 23 Edmonson provides a
'm While there is no current mechanism to address improper peremptory challenges, this
Article proposes a statute to address exactly this concern. See infra notes 369-404 and
accompanying text.
m See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
221 This Article recommends adoption of a statute that will address the issue of remedies
for improper peremptory challenges that occur during arbitration. See infra notes 369-404
and accompanying text.
= "[Tihe benign, unobtrusive federal policy favoring arbitration is unlike the tacit
approval of racial discrimination found in Reitman v. Mulkey, where a statute granted
landowners absolute discretion in deciding to whom to rent or sell property." Davis, supra
note 69, at 611.
20 See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text (discussing cases where no state action
was found).
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compelling analogy. 21 4  According to the Edmonson Court, the
approval of the peremptory challenge is state action because the
court "made itself a party to the [biased act and] ... elected to place
its power, property and prestige behind the [alleged]
discrimination."" 5 The government both "create[d] the legal
framework governing the [challenged] conduct," and in a significant
way "has involved itself with invidious discrimination."2 36 Although
similar to a peremptory challenge in arbitration, the major
difference-that the court's approval of the peremptory challenge
occurred in court, utilizing the court's power and involving the court
in the discrimination-is dispositive. In the case of arbitration, a
court would merely approve a facially neutral arbitration award. It
would be difficult to describe the court's behavior in this latter case
as significant involvement with invidious discrimination. Thus,
applying any of the existing case law yields the same outcome.
2. Public Function and Arbitration. The best argument for
finding state action in arbitration under the public function doctrine
is that arbitration is traditionally an exclusive function of the state.
In his article, Professor Reuben contends that binding dispute
resolution, particularly arbitration, is "a traditionally exclusive
public function." 7 Reuben argues that because an arbitral ruling
is enforceable only after a judge enters the award as a judgment
according to the FAA or state arbitration laws, it does not operate
independently from the state.238
Actual arbitration practice rebuts this argument. Arbitration
began as an extra-judicial mechanism for resolving disputes. 23 9 In
fact, until Congress passed the FAA in 1925, courts did not typically
enforce arbitration agreements and awards. 4° Instead, parties
24 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
500 U.S. at 624.
236 Id. (citations omitted).
27 Reuben, supra note 62, at 997-98 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375
(1971)) (finding that state has "monopoly over techniques for binding conflict resolution").
2m Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REv. 577,621-22 (1997). Reuben states that "the state-enforced
resolution of disputes... distinguishes matters of constitutional moment from those ofpurely
private concern." Id.
29 See 1 EDMONDSON, supra note 191, § 2:4. Cole, supra note 205, at 464-66 (describing
arbitration's origins).
"o Id. § 2.5.
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abided by agreements to arbitrate or arbitration awards out of fear
that they would be ostracized from the commercial community and
to preserve ongoing relationships.24' Even after Congress enacted
the FAA, groups continued to utilize arbitration and enforce
arbitration awards without resort to the court.242 Thus, the
contention that dispute resolution is a unique function of the state
seems inaccurate.243
The argument that parties may resort to the courts to enforce
arbitration agreements or awards does not transform binding
dispute resolution into a public function. Dispute resolution is
different than the running of elections or education because the
parties, not the government, delegate the power to the arbitrator to
resolve the dispute.24' That the court may ultimately become
involved in the dispute does not affect the analysis. Absent
government delegation of the public function to a private entity, the
Court will not find state action using the public function test.2 45
An analysis of existing case law demonstrates that state action
is not present when a private litigant exercises a peremptory
241 Cole, supra note 205, at 460.
IAN R. MACNEIL, AmERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 4 (1992) (explaining that "[tihe word
alternative means alternative to dispute resolution processes of the State-the judges, juries,
administrative dispute resolvers, and the like of the State legal system"); Bruce L. Benson,
An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of
Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 481 (1995) (stating that "while
common law judges were apparently hostile toward arbitration in the late 1700s and early
1800s, arbitration was, nonetheless, widely practiced' and that "[alrbitration actually was in
widespread use in the United States almost three centuries before modern arbitration
statutes were passed. . ."); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724, 1724
(2001) (describing cotton industry's private arbitral mechanism for resolving disputes); Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115,115 (1992) (describing diamond industry's use of arbitration
to resolve disputes).
' Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 (1978). The Court would likely be reluctant
to declare arbitration state action for another reason. According to the Flagg Bros. Court,
"even if we were inclined to extend the sovereign-function doctrine outside of its present
carefully confined bounds, the field of private commercial transactions would be aparticularly
inappropriate area into which to expand it." Id. (emphasis added).
2" See Buchanan, supra note 73, at 345 (discussing that public function issue considers
question of how "governmental" activity delegated to private entity is).
2* See Davis, supra note 69, at 610 (arguing that judicial enforcement of arbitration
agreement or award is not state action because no discriminatory impact on minorities
occurs); see supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text (discussing nature of court's direct
involvement in sanctioning discrimination).
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challenge in an arbitral proceeding.4 Arguments to the contrary
are unavailing because the factors present in those cases where
state action is found-overt racial discrimination, compulsion of
jurors, institutional integrity of the courts-are not at issue when
a court evaluates an arbitral award that was written by an
arbitrator who would not have been chosen but for a tainted
selection process. While this Article proposes a variety of means
to avoid or sanction improper peremptory challenges in the arbitral
setting, it nevertheless concludes that state action analysis is not
an appropriate means by which a litigant might achieve that
laudatory goal.
IV. A PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS RESPECTING DISCRIMINATORY
SELECTION OF AN ARBITRATOR
In this Part, we consider whether it contravenes public policy for
a court to compel participation in an arbitration proceeding before
an arbitrator selected on the basis of a characteristic that would not
be a permissible basis for a peremptory strike in a public court
proceeding2 '7 or to enforce an arbitration award arising from an
arbitration influenced by the discriminatory selection of an arbitra-
tor. We divide our analysis into two parts: First, we consider
whether existing case precedent militates against such compulsion
or enforcement. Second, we consider the public policies that
should inform our proposed model statute with respect to these
points. In particular, and in light of these policies, we consider the
circumstances in which a court should enforce a contract to
participate in an arbitration proceeding that involves such a
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Our proposed model statute would not allow an interlocutory appeal of an arbitrator's
ruling denying an arbitration party's Batson-like challenge to his selection (or the ruling by
a panel of arbitrators on a challenge to the selection of any of them). See infra notes 397-98
and accompanying text (noting that there can be no challenge to arbitrator's qualifications
or partiality until final arbitration award). A court might still confront this issue prior to the
arbitrator's final award in the context of a motion to compel arbitration. Where one party to
an arbitration contract brings a motion to compel arbitration, the party opposing the motion
to compel arbitration might assert as a reason to deny the motion the actual or likely
discriminatory selection of an arbitrator.
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discriminatory selection of an arbitrator or enforce an arbitration
award that involves a discriminatory selection of an arbitrator.
A. CONSIDERATION OF A PUBLIC POLICY CHALLENGE UNDER EXISTING
CASE LAW
We begin by considering whether existing case law would support
a court's refusal to enforce an arbitration contract or an arbitration
award affected by discriminatory arbitrator selection. A court may
refuse to enforce a contract that is contrary to law or public policy.2
That doctrine derives from the basic notion that no court
will lend its aid to one who founds a cause of action upon
an immoral or illegal act, and is further justified by the
observation that the public's interests in confining the
scope of private agreements to which it is not a party
will go unrepresented unless the judiciary takes account
of those interests when it considers whether to enforce
such agreements.249
"While courts are hesitant to invalidate contracts on these public
policy grounds, the public interest in freedom of contract is some-
times outweighed by other public policy considerations; in those
cases the contract will not be enforced."20 Both within and outside
of the arbitration context, courts have refused to enforce contracts
in a variety of contexts and in light of a variety of public policies.25'
2" Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948).
"' United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,42 (1987); see also Stephen
L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration
Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731,784-85 (1996) ('[Ihe true origin of the 'public policy' ground for
vacatur [of commercial arbitration awards] lies in the doctrine of the common law of contracts
that a court can refuse to enforce a contract if doing so would violate (a well-defined and
dominant) public policy.").
o A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000).
"1 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon's Seamen's Union, 11 F.3d 1189, 1196 (3d Cir.
1993) (holding that public policy justified vacating arbitration award that ordered
reinstatement of oil tanker worker who reported for work intoxicated); Newsday, Inc. v. Long
Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (vacating on public policy
grounds arbitrator's order to reinstate employee who engaged in acts of sexual harassment
after being warned that further acts of sexual harassment would result in his termination);
A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1058-59 ("derivtingi from existing State laws and judicial precedent a
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The issue then would seem to be whether a private disputant's
selection or striking of an arbitrator based upon the arbitrator's
race, sex, or other characteristic-the consideration of which Batson
would not allow in juror selection-is illegal, immoral or otherwise
harmful to the public's interests and, if so, whether a court should
vindicate the public's interest in discouraging such behavior by
refusing to enforce such a "tainted" arbitration contract or resulting
arbitration award. Existing case law, however, suggests a tougher
standard for invalidation. It suggests that a court should not refuse
to enforce such a tainted contract or award based merely upon
"general considerations of supposed public interests."252 Specifically,
in the context of an arbitrator's interpretation of a contract, the case
law teaches that a court may refuse on public policy grounds to
enforce a contract only when that contract as interpreted by the
arbitrator violates an "explicit," "well defined and dominant" public
policy that has been "ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public
interests.' ""'
To date, the Supreme Court has addressed public policy chal-
lenges to the enforcement of arbitration awards in three cases.'"
Although these cases have arisen in the collective bargaining
public policy in [Massachusetts] that individuals shall not be compelled to enter into intimate
family relationships" and holding that in light of this public policy"prior agreements to enter
into familial relationships (marriage or parenthood) should not be enforced against
individuals who subsequently reconsider their decisions"); id. at n.24 (citing cases arising in
variety of contexts in which court refused to enforce contract because contract contravened
public policy).
2 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Intl Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum
& Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
2s Id. at 766. See also Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 43:
[I]t is apparent that our decision in [W.R. Grace & Co.] does not otherwise
sanction a broad judicial power to set aside arbitration awards as against
public policy .... At the very least, an alleged public policy must be
properly framed under the approach set out in W.R. Grace, and the
violation of such a policy must be clearly shown if an award is not to be
enforced.
See generally E. Associated Coal v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding
that public policy does not require nonenforcement of award); Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 29
(holding that court exceeded authority in vacating arbitration award); W.R. Grace & Co., 461
U.S. at 757 (finding that enforcement of arbitration award does not violate public policy).
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context, lower courts apply the Court's holdings outside the
collective bargaining context to all species of arbitration.
2 55
The Court's opinions in this area have identified the outer
boundaries of this public policy exception in the arbitration
context. 6 First, what matters is that the arbitration award itself
violates a public policy. 7 It is not sufficient that the conduct that
gave rise to the dispute that is being arbitrated violates public
policy. 21 Second, it is not necessary that the arbitration award
itself violates or calls for the violation of positive law in order for a
court to invoke the public policy exception.259 It is sufficient that the
award conflicts with a public policy embodied in such positive law.1
60
Third, it is not sufficient that the public policy which the court may
" CARBONNEAU, supra note 57, at 500 ("In general, the courts ignore the decisional
origins and intended specific application of the public policy exception, deeming it applicable
in all cases involving the enforcement of arbitral awards."); Hayford, supra note 249, at 779
("The well developed body of case law pertaining to the labor arbitration 'public policy
exception' provides a ready source of authority and guidance to the circuit courts that choose
to embrace this standard" in the commercial arbitration context); id. at 784 ( {T]he 'public
policy' standard for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards has been adopted intact from
the law of labor arbitration by a number of circuit courts with no attempt to reconcile the
standard with the language of section 10(a) of the FAA."); Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. REsOL. 91, 92 (2000) ("The public policy standards developed in labor arbitration cases
have been utilized by courts reviewing commercial and employment law arbitration awards.").
' In Eastern Associated Coal v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57 (2000), the Supreme
Court made clear the first two boundaries that we list. One may find many cases predating
Eastern Associated Coal that take a broader or narrower approach. See David M. Glanstein,
A Hail Mary Pass: Public Policy Review of Arbitration Awards, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 297, 298 (2001) ("Some of these cases must be re-examined in light of Eastern
Associated Coal, which clarified the appropriate inquiry for courts engaged in public policy
review in a way which runs contrary to the approaches taken by some federal circuit courts.");
Hodges, supra note 255, at 121-22 (reviewing many cases-prior to Eastern Associated
Coal-in which courts set aside arbitration awards on public policy grounds and noting that
these cases involved broad application of public policy doctrine, as well as focused on conduct
that led to dispute rather than on arbitration award); Judith Stilz Ogden, Do Public Policy
Grounds Still Exist for Vacating Arbitration Awards?, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 87,105
(2002) (noting that Eastern Associated Coal's holding that public policy analysis must focus
on arbitration award rather than on conduct that gave rise to dispute "is inconsistent with
numerous court of appeals decisions, which adopted the broader view and which often vacated
the awards").
23' E. Associated Coal, 531 U.S. at 62-63 (holding that "the question to be answered is not
whether [the employee]'s drug use itself violates public policy, but whether the agreement to
reinstate him does so").
2M Id.
" Id. at63.
= Id.
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identify arises from common knowledge or common sense.261 The
public policy must be found in statutes, regulations or common law
doctrines.26 2
In considering a public policy challenge to an arbitrator's
interpretation of a contract, a court begins by reading the arbitra-
tion award back into the contract.263 That is, the court pretends that
the arbitration award was an express term of the contract.
Consider, for example, the facts of the most recent case in which the
Supreme Court applied the public policy doctrine in the arbitration
context. In Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine
Workers,2" Eastern brought an action to vacate an arbitration
award ordering the reinstatement of a union member truck driver
whose employment Eastern had terminated after the employee
twice had tested positive for marijuana use.2 5 Eastern and the
United Mine Workers were parties to a collective bargaining
agreement that required Eastern to prove "just cause" to discharge
a union employee and provided that an arbitrator would have the
final say on whether or not just cause existed.' In adjudicating
Eastern's public policy challenge to the arbitration award ordering
reinstatement, the Court read the arbitration award back into the
contract: The Court assumed for the purposes of deciding the claim
that the contract between Eastern and the union expressly called for
the employee's reinstatement despite his having twice tested
8 United Paperworkers Intl Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 44(1987) (holding that
although "policy against the operation of dangerous machinery while under the influence of
drugs" was "firmly rooted in common sense," such" 'general considerations of supposed public
interests' "was by itself insufficient to set aside arbitration award on public policy grounds)
(quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Intl Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum,
& Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983)).
2" Glanstein, supra note 256, at 299 ("What constitutes explicit, well-defined, and
dominant public policy varies, but courts have held such policy exists when the alleged rule
is expressed in statutes, regulations, or clear common law doctrines."); see also id. at 299-300,
300 n.14 (citing several cases in which court refused to overturn arbitration award after
concluding that asserted public policy was "only expressed in the internal policies of an
employer or trade association, or in general concerns about supposed public interests").
2 See E. Associated Coal, 531 U.S. at 62 (stating that Court "must treat the arbitrator's
award as if it represented an agreement between [the contracting parties] as to the proper
meaning of the contract's words").
2"' Id. at 60-61.
= Id.
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positive for marijuana during the course of his employment.267 In
this way, an arbitration award is thought of as part of the contract
that is the subject of the arbitration.2s
Once a court so reads the contract, it must then ask whether that
contract (as read) contravenes an "explicit," "well defined" and
"dominant" public policy that the court is able to identify from
existing statutes or case law, such that it would not be appropriate
for the court to enforce the contract.8 9 Once again, Eastern
Associated Coal illustrates the process. In that case the employer
pointed to federal statutes and regulations explicitly aimed at
eliminating the use of illegal drugs by persons in certain safety-
sensitive positions, including truck drivers.27 ' This positive law
called for drug testing of truck drivers, mandated suspension for
truck drivers who had operated commercial vehicles while under the
influence of drugs, and set out sanctions for drivers who had tested
positive for drugs.2  In light of this positive law, Eastern argued
that the arbitrator's order to reinstate a truck driver who twice had
tested positive for marijuana undermined the "strong public policy
against drug use by transportation workers in safety-sensitive
positions" embodied in this positive law.272
The Supreme Court rejected this argument.2 7 3 The Court pointed
to provisions of the relevant statute that aimed to promote rehabili-
tation where "appropriate."27' The Court further noted that the
relevant regulations put limits on the conditions under which an
employer could reinstate a driver who had tested positive for drugs,
but "Ineither the Act nor the regulations forbid an employer to
reinstate in a safety-sensitive position an employee who fails a
random drug test once or twice."
2 75
2" Id. at 61-62.
2u See id. at 62 ("W]e must treat the arbitrator's award as if it represented an agreement
between [the parties] as to the proper meaning of the words 'just cause.' "); id. ("For present
purposes, the award is not distinguishable from the contractual agreement.").
m Id.
0 Id. at 63-64.
1 Id. at 64.
2 Id.
m Id.
274 Id.
25 Id. at 65.
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The Court considered both the policy against drug use by workers
in safety-sensitive transportation positions and the policy favoring
rehabilitation of such workers who have used drugs.276 It then held
that the arbitrator's reinstatement order did not contravene these
policies "taken together," pointing to the fact that "[tihe award
violates no specific provision of any law or regulation."2 77 The
Court's opinion suggests a great reluctance in this context to finding
an "explicit," "well defined" and "dominant" public policy in more
general positive law: "Neither Congress nor the Secretary [of
Transportation] has seen fit to mandate the discharge of a worker
who twice tests positive for drugs. We hesitate to infer a public
policy in this area that goes beyond the careful and detailed scheme
Congress and the Secretary have created."278
Eastern Associated Coal confirms that the scope of the public
policy doctrine is quite narrow in the arbitration context.2 79 One
commentator who, in the light of Eastern Associated Coal, reviewed
the extensive case law addressing public policy challenges to
arbitration awards, concluded that "while the Supreme Court in
Eastern Associated Coal left open the door for successful public
policy challenges absent express statutory prohibitions against the
terms of the awards, there is clearly only limited chance for success
absent positive law expressly militating against enforcement of an
award."'
The issue at hand-enforcement of an arbitration contract or
arbitration award tainted by the discriminatory selection of an
arbitrator-fits somewhat awkwardly into this arbitrationjurispru-
dence. The instant complaint is not strictly against the substance
of an award but rather is against the process by which the award is
'/6 Id.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 67.
' See Paula A. Barran & Todd A. Hanchett, Public Policy Challenges to Labor
Arbitration Awards: Still a Safe Harbor for Silly Fact FindingF, 38 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 233,
254 (2002) ("Eastern signaled the closing of the public policy door, leaving open only a narrow
sliver."); Ogden, supra note 256, at 116 ("Eastern Associated Coal... demonstrate[s] that it
will be difficult to have an arbitration award set aside.").
2w Glanstein, supra note 256, at 300. For reviews of cases applying Eastern Associated
Coal to public policy challenges to arbitration awards, see Barren & Hanchett, supra note 279,
at 254-57 (discussing recent cases decided since Eastern Associated Coal); Ogden, supra note
256, at 107-15 (discussing how lower courts find exceptions to Eastern Associated Coal).
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to be made or came to be made. With respect to an arbitration
award tainted by discriminatory selection of an arbitrator, the party
opposing enforcement is not alleging that the interpretation of the
contract violates public policy. Rather, he is alleging that the
selection of the interpreter of the contract violates public policy.
A party to an arbitration contract should be able to assert a
process-centered public policy claim. The notion that "the public's
interests in confining the scope of private agreements to which it is
not a party will go unrepresented unless the judiciary takes account
of those interests when it considers whether to enforce such
agreements" 28 ' would seem to apply no less to process than to
substance. Consider an extreme example: The parties have
contracted for arbitration of any dispute that might arise between
them. The contract further provides that evidentiary disputes
during the arbitration shall be settled by duel. Due to the illegal
nature of dueling, a court should not enforce such an agreement on
public policy grounds.
When a party to an arbitration contract brings a public policy
challenge to enforcement of the contract or a resulting arbitration
award on the ground that the other party has selected an arbitrator
on the basis of a characteristic that would not be a permissible basis
in a public court proceeding, a court should read that allegation into
the contract for the purposes of deciding the public policy challenge.
The court should read the contract, therefore, as calling for the
discriminatory selection of the arbitrator.282 The issue then becomes
whether enforcement of such a contract would violate public policy.
More specifically, the issue becomes whether enforcement of such
a contract would violate an "explicit," "well defined and dominant"
public policy that has been "ascertained 'by reference to the laws
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of
"' United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987).
282 At the same time, where the parties have not expressly agreed to such discriminatory
selection, the court should not analyze the claim as one where both parties consented to the
discrimination. While it may seem conceptually impossible, the court should view the
contract as calling for the discriminatory selection of the arbitrator against the will of one of
the parties to the contract. We discuss below how the public policy analysis is impacted when
both or all parties to the dispute expressly consent to the discriminatory selection of an
arbitrator. See infra notes 325-31, 334-39, 347-50, 354-58 and accompanying texts.
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supposed public interests.' "28' With respect to arbitration, the
standard for a public policy challenge to the enforcement of an
arbitration award (or contract) should be identical whether the
challenge is substantive (i.e., the arbitrator's interpretation of the
contract violates public policy), or procedural (i.e., the selection of
the interpreter of the contract violates public policy). This result is
so because the arbitration-based policies implicated by one party's
efforts to avoid the arbitration contract or award are the same in
both cases.
Many parties who contract for arbitration do so out of a desire to
resolve an actual or anticipated dispute in an expeditious and cost-
efficient manner.2" Limiting judicial review of an arbitrator's
award is a part of this bargain and protects the parties' interests in
limiting the time and emotional and financial costs needed to
resolve their dispute.2 A party's resort to litigation to overturn the
arbitration contract or award should be allowed, therefore, only in
well-defined and extreme circumstances. In the context of a public
policy challenge to an arbitration award or contract, the Supreme
2' W.R. Grace & Co., v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum
and Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983); see also Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 43 (quoting
W.R. Grace & Co.).
2" See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,633 (1985)
(stating that "it is often a judgment that streamlined proceedings and expeditious results will
best serve their needs that causes parties to agree to arbitrate their disputes; it is typically
a desire to keep the effort and expense required to resolve a dispute within manageable
bounds that prompts them mutually to forgo access to judicial remedies"); CARBONNEAU,
supra note 57, at 4 ('Parties generally engage in arbitration to achieve quicker results.");
Hayford, supra note 249, at 740-41 ("In effect, the parties to a commercial arbitration
proceeding agree to 'pay their quarters and take their chances' in an alternative adjudicative
forum intended to provide a mode of dispute resolution that is less complex, less expensive,
and more expeditious than traditional litigation.").
2" See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) ("Although
[arbitration discovery] procedures might not be as extensive as in the federal courts, by
agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.'") (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,628 (1985)); CARBONNEAu, supra
note 57, at 4 (The benefit of the bargain for expedient adjudication carries with it the
prospect that expectations of procedural and substantive fairness will be frustrated, without
the possibility of further recourse, when the arbitrators' adjudicatory conduct is disappointing
or unprofessional); Glanstein, supra note 256, at 297 (commenting that "courts have only a
limited role in reviewing arbitration decisions because excessive judicial interference would
undermine the use of arbitration as an alternative means for settling disputes"); Hodges,
supra note 255, at 93 ("Finality of arbitration awards is one of the substantial virtues of the
arbitral system.").
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Court has defined those circumstances as occurring only when the
challenged contract or award offends an "explicit," "well defined and
dominant" public policy.
2sM
Statutory and case law set out an "explicit," "well defined and
dominant" public policy against the use of race and sex in jury
selection. According to 18 U.S.C. § 243, "[n]o citizen possessing all
other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be
disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."2 7  Moreover, the Batson line of cases,
discussed above, holds that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a
state actor from excluding a person from jury service on account of
that person's race or sex.2"'
But this public policy is "explicit," "well defined and dominant"
only for discriminatory juror selection. The statutory and case law
on discriminatory juror selection does not address discriminatory
selection of an arbitrator or other neutral. For the reasons set out
below, we conclude that this positive law against discrimination in
selecting a juror cannot support a successful public policy argument
" W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766.
287 18 U.S.C. § 243 (2004); see also, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-56 (1995) ("A citizen shall not
be excluded from jury service in this state on account of race, color, religion, sex, national
origin or economic status."); CAL. CIVIL PROC. CODE § 231.5 (West Supp. 2004) ("A party may
not use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of an assumption
that the prospective juror is biased merely because of his or her race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, sexual orientation, or similar grounds."); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1903 (2001)
(A citizen of the District of Columbia may not be excluded or disqualified
from jury service as a grand or petit juror in the District of Columbia on
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, economic
status, marital status, age, or (except as provided in this chapter) physical
handicap.);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234A, § 3 (West 2000) ("No person shall be exempted or excluded
from serving as a grand or trial juror because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
economic status, or occupation. Physically handicapped persons shall serve except where the
court finds such service is not feasible."); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 756.001(3) (West 2001)
(No person who is qualified and able to serve as a juror may be excluded
from that service in any court of this state on the basis of sex, race, color,
sexual orientation as defined in a. 111.32(13m), disability, religion,
national origin, marital status, family status, lawful source of income, age
or ancestry or because of a physical condition.).
2 See supra notes 13-56 and accompanying text.
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against enforcement of an arbitration contract or award involving
the discriminatory selection of an arbitrator.
One could generalize from the policies set out in the context of
juror selection to derive policies arguably applicable to selection of
an arbitrator. For example, one might generalize from the Batson
case law that the practice of discriminatory selection of an arbitrator
may help maintain or exacerbate racial or other tensions that exist
within society and, thereby, undermine the goal of a progression
toward a society in which people are judged by their abilities and
not by racial, gender, or other stereotypes.289 But we think such a
generalization, and other generalizations that might be made from
the positive law against discriminatory juror selection, would not
satisfy the strict requirement that an arbitration contract or award
not be struck on public policy grounds absent a finding that
enforcement would violate an "explicit," "well defined and dominant"
public policy that has been "ascertained 'by reference to the laws
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of
supposed public interests.' 0
Important differences exist between the nature of jury service
and service as an arbitrator, and these differences suggest that
public policy considerations necessarily differ from one context to
the other. Jury service, in contrast to service as an arbitrator, is an
important civic right.2 91 "The opportunity for ordinary citizens to
participate in the administration ofjustice has long been recognized
as one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury system." 2
M See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42,59 (1992) ("In our heterogeneous society policy
as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption-as aper se
rule-that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of
birth, or the choice of religion.") (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976));
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,630-31 (1991) ("If our society is to continue
to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of
race stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury.").
29 W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766; see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43 (1987) (discussing decision in W.R. Grace & Co.).
291 See infra note 343 and accompanying text; see also Barbara D. Underwood, Ending
Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725,
727 (1992) ("The American jury is universally understood as an important institution of
democratic government (and] [e]xclusion of any person from such an institution by reason of
race does violence to centrally important constitutional ideals of equal access to government,
quite apart from any particular effect on verdicts.").
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 (1991).
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Moreover, jury service serves a vital public interest in that it
"preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the rights
of the parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all of
the people."293 Jury service is also an important civic duty. Jurors
are called to serve by subpoena.29 ' The state coerces the potential
juror's appearance where the potential juror would be subject to
discrimination. In contrast, an arbitrator is free to decline
service.29 The jury, unlike an arbitrator or arbitration panel, is a
"quintessential governmental body" which interacts with and shares
decisionmaking authority with the judge.296 Thus, the relationship
between the state and the decisionmaker is much closer in the case
of a jury as contrasted with the case of an arbitrator. Finally, the
jury is assembled, selected, and functions in the public courtroom
and in public view under procedures promulgated by the state.297
Arbitrators, on the contrary, generally are chosen in private by a
court clerk or arbitral organization and perform their duties in a
private setting under procedures set by or adopted by the disputants
themselves. 298 Discrimination in juror selection, therefore, is much
more likely to undermine the integrity of the judicial system.299 For
all these reasons, we find it inappropriate to generalize from the
positive law against discriminatory juror selection a public policy
against discriminatory selection of an arbitrator.
No statute or body of case law similar to that addressing
discriminatory juror selection speaks explicitly against discrimina-
tion in the selection of an arbitrator or other neutral. Arguably, the
closest law on point has arisen in the context of contracts that
m Id. at 407.
29 See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text (discussing state coercion involved in
assembling jury).
2w See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
2 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624-28 (discussing differences
between private and governmental actors); see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
n See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing importance of fact that
discrimination in jury selection takes place in courtroom).
2 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing effects of discrimination in juror
selection).
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provide for "egregiously unfair" procedures for selection of an
arbitrator s.3 00 But we think this case law also is too far removed
from the issue at hand to support a public policy argument against
enforcement of an arbitration contract or award "tainted" by the
discriminatory selection of an arbitrator.
Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips provides an example of this
case law."' l In Hooters of America, Inc., a Hooters restaurant and
one of its employees, Annette Phillips, had entered into an arbitra-
tion contract that called for arbitration of any employment-related
dispute that might arise between them.302 The agreement further
provided that the arbitration would be governed by rules and
procedures that Hooters would promulgate "from time to time."303
After Phillips alleged that a Hooters official sexually harassed her
in a manner prohibited by Title VII, Hooters moved to compel
arbitration under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act.0 4
Phillips opposed the motion on the grounds that the arbitration
agreement was not enforceable.0 5
Among the procedures Hooters promulgated pursuant to the
arbitration contract were rules for the selection of a three-person
arbitration panel.0 ' Those rules provided that both Hooters and the
employee were entitled to select one arbitrator from a list of
potential arbitrators drawn up by Hooters."°7 Those two arbitrators
m See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933,938 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that
party to arbitration agreement "materially breached the arbitration agreement by
promulgating rules so egregiously unfair as to constitute a complete default of its contractual
obligation to draft arbitration rules and to do so in good faith"); Graham v. Scissor Tail, Inc.,
623 P.2d 165, 172-73 (Cal. 1981) (vacating arbitrator's award where arbitration agreement,
which was contained in contract of adhesion, designated arbitrator who, "by reason of its
status and identity, is presumptively biased in favor of one party"); Cross & Brown Co. v.
Nelson, 167 N.Y.S.2d 573, 576 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957) (holding that arbitration agreement
between employer and employee which called for employer to act as arbitrator "outragfed]
public policy" and was void on its face); see also Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v.
Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 308-09 (1986) (finding Union's arbitration procedure constitutionally
inadequate because, among other things, "Union's unrestricted choice" of arbitrator did not
ensure impartial decisionmaker).
3' See Hooters of Am., Inc., 173 F.3d at 940-41 (refusing to uphold arbitration contract).
3 Id. at 936.
M3 Id.
3W Id.
3Id.
s Id. at 938-39.M Id.
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would then select a third arbitrator from the list drawn up by
Hooters.08° The rules put no limits on whom Hooters might put on
the list of potential arbitrators."0 9 As the court pointed out, the
rules allowed Hooters to place on the list its managers and others
with a financial or familial relationship with the company.310
Moreover, the rules allowed Hooters to remove from the list any
arbitrator that displeased it by ruling against it in an arbitration.1 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found
that these procedures were "crafted to ensure a biased
decisionmaker." 12 The court further found that "[tihe Hooters rules
when taken as a whole... are so one-sided that their only possible
purpose is to undermine the neutrality of the proceeding." 13 As the
parties had purported to contract for arbitration-a "neutral
forum,"3 1' the court refused to enforce the arbitration contract,
holding that "the promulgation of so many biased rules-especially
the scheme whereby one party to the proceeding so controls the
arbitral panel-breaches the contract entered into by the parties." 5
Arguably, Hooters of America, Inc. and similar cases set out an
"explicit," "well defined and dominant" public policy against
enforcement of arbitration agreements that provide for arbitrator
selection procedures "inimical to fundamental notions of fairness."318
SId.
Id. at 939.
310 Id.
all Id.
3'2 Id. at 938.
318 Id. Additionalrules promulgatedby Hooters required the employee to provide Hooters
with a statement of her claim but did not require Hooters to file any responsive pleading;
required the employee but not Hooters to list all fact witnesses and a summary of their
relevant knowledge ofthe facts; allowed Hooters to expand the scope of the proceeding to any
matter" while barring the employee from raising any matter not included in her statement
of claim; allowed Hooters but not the employee to move for summary judgment before a
hearing was held; allowed Hooters but not the employee to record or transcribe the
arbitration hearing; allowed Hooters but not the employee to move for a court to vacate or
modify an arbitral award where the preponderance of the evidence suggested that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority, and allowed Hooters but not the employee to cancel the
arbitration agreement with thirty days notice. Id. at 938-39. Moreover, Hooters enjoyed the
right to unilaterally modify its rules at any time including during the course of an arbitration
hearing and without notice to the employee. Id
314 Id. at 938.
315 Id. at 940.
s6 Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 173-74 (Cal. 1981).
2004] 1209
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 1209 2003-2004
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
We do not believe, however, that discriminatory selection of an
arbitrator is "inimical to fundamental notions of fairness." That an
arbitrator is selected or rejected because of his race or sex, for
example, does not seem to us necessarily to "set up a dispute
resolution process utterly lacking in the rudiments of even handed-
ness" 17 or preclude a "neutral[ I . . . proceeding."318  That an
arbitrator has been so chosen does not evidence that he will not
remain neutral as between the parties. As one of us has argued
elsewhere:
That the [party to the dispute] share[s] a common
minority culture with the arbitrator... should not alone
disqualify the arbitrator from adjudicating the . . .
contest. Although such a shared culture can be expected
to give rise to greater understanding between the
arbitrator and the [party], the arbitrator's interest in the
dispute might remain quite attenuated. Such a broad
disqualification based on presumed cultural bias logi-
cally extended to other types of disputes would, for
example, suggest that a female arbitrator may not fairly
adjudicate a dispute regarding property division upon
dissolution of a marriage or a female employee's claim of
heterosexual sexual harassment. Indeed, unless one is
willing to posit that minority-culture arbitrators are
meaningfully more culturally biased as compared with
arbitrators from the majority culture, such inter-cultural
disputes could be fairly arbitrated, under such a broad
disqualification rule, only before panels on which none
or all of the cultural subgroups is represented. 19
117 Hooters of Am., Inc., 173 F.3d at 935.
3 Id. at 938.
3 E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
275, 312 (1999); see also Smith v. Argenbright, Inc., No. 99C7368, 1999 WL 1270674, at *2
(N.D. Il. Dec. 27, 1999) (holding that party to arbitration may not bring evident partiality
claim until conclusion of arbitration proceeding and commenting that "we are extremely
skeptical of [the arbitration partyl's ability to prove the substance of her claim-unfair bias
as the inevitable result of the panel's gender composition"); Park v. First Union Brokerage
Servs., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1085,1088-89 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (rejecting contention that arbitration
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In sum, no "explicit," "well defined and dominant" public policy
against the discriminatory selection of an arbitrator may be
ascertained from existing positive law. Therefore, a disputant's
public policy challenge to the enforcement of an arbitration contract
or award involving such discriminatory arbitrator selection must
fail. We turn next to the issue of whether the law should be
amended to ban such discriminatory selection.
B. A PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS INFORMING OUR PROPOSED MODEL
STATUTE
Although it may be inappropriate under present Supreme Court
precedent to generalize from the statutory and case law relating to
juror selection for the purposes of evaluating a public policy
challenge to the enforcement of an arbitration contract or award, we
think it is appropriate to do so for the purposes of considering what
the law in this area should be. Moreover, we think it appropriate in
drafting our proposed model statute governing discriminatory
arbitrator selection to evaluate also "general considerations of
supposed public interests."320 We turn now to an exploration of
those policies and interests and an evaluation of how such policies
and interests should inform our model statute.
The Supreme Court has elucidated how discriminatory juror
selection harms three distinct interested parties.8 2' The affected
parties are the litigant, the excluded juror (or more generally, the
excluded decisionmaker), and the community. 22 We believe that
any proposed statute relating to discriminatory selection of a private
organization's alleged selection of arbitrator because of her sex supports finding of 'evident
partiality" where complaining party had "failed to demonstrate any [actual] evident partiality
in the individual arbitrators that sat on the case"); Hotel, Motel & Rest. Employees &
Bartenders Union, Local 471, AFL-CIO v. P. & J.G. Enter., Inc., 731 F. Supp. 88,92 (N.D.N.Y.
1990) ("Mere conclusory allegations by [the employer] that the arbitrator's decisions were
racially motivated or that the fact the two employees involved were white indicates prejudice
in their favor, are insufficient to show 'evident partiality' on the part of the arbitrator.").
3 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 159, Int'l Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum,
& Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S.
49, 66 (1945)).
21 See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
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arbitrator should consider the effects of discriminatory selection on
these three entities.
At times, the interests of these entities will conflict. These
conflicts call for a balancing of interests. In structuring a proposed
model statute, therefore, we as drafters must make normative
* choices."'
1. The Interests of the Disputants. Discriminatory selection of a
decisionmaker impacts the litigants. The Supreme Court has noted
that with discriminatory juror selection, the non-discriminating
litigant is subjected to an increased risk that the judicial proceeding
will be affected by the same prejudice that affected the selection of
the jury.32' This risk is also present with discriminatory selection
of an arbitrator.
At this point, we think it critical, however, to distinguish between
consensual discrimination (discrimination to which all disputants
have expressly consented) and non-consensual discrimination
(discrimination to which at least one disputant has not expressly
consented). We believe that as between the two types of cases, the
harms to the affected entities differ in meaningful ways. Indeed, in
considering each of the public policies that should inform our
statute, we think it important to consider how the public policy
analysis would differ in cases in which both or all parties to the
dispute expressly consent to discriminatory selection of an arbitra-
tor. We shall analyze, therefore, how discriminatory selection of an
arbitrator impacts each affected entity in situations where, respec-
tively, the disputants have not expressly consented to the discrimi-
nation and where they have so consented.
As noted above, with discriminatory selection of an arbitrator,
the non-discriminating litigant is subjected to an increased risk that
' See Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on Public Confidence
in the Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1177,1179-80
(1994) (suggesting that it would be appropriate to focus on interests of society in maximizing
public confidence in fairness of jury proceedings, when interest of defendant in diverse jury
and interest of potential juror in race-neutral juror selection conflict); id. at 1201 (noting that
empirical evidence is informative in deciding how to balance interests of defendants, potential
jurors and society, but "(ulltimately .... the questions judges must answer are not merely
descriptive, they are also normative[; therefore,] [wihen perceptions conflict, judges must
decide whose trust is most essential to cultivate").
' See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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the arbitration proceeding will be affected by the same prejudice
that affected the selection of the arbitrator. 2 ' In the Non-Consen-
sual Scenario that we set out in the introduction to this Article,
3 26
for example, the Jewish employee suffers an increased risk that the
arbitration panel will be biased against a Jewish complainant or
more sympathetic to Irish Catholic decisionmakers because the
employer/respondent used a peremptory strike to remove a Jewish
arbitrator and, in his stead, the arbitral organization appointed an
Irish Catholic arbitrator. To put not too fine a point on the matter,
we think it reasonable to posit that a Catholic is more likely to be
anti-Semitic than is a Jew. 27
In the case of a disputant who has expressly consented to the
prejudice, however, it is the calculation and hope of the disputant
that the proceeding will be affected by the prejudice. In the
Consensual Scenario, 28 for example, the husband and wife have not
merely chosen to submit their dispute to a panel of arbitrators who
will be knowledgeable about Jewish law. They have contracted to
select arbitrators who share their Jewish faith.3 29 It is likely that
the husband and wife have calculated that the Jewish arbitrators
will be invested in the promotion of the Jewish religion-an interest
that the disputants share at the time of their contracting. The
parties have mutually calculated and contracted that the arbitration
award will be informed by and faithful to that mutual interest.
Therefore, where the parties have mutually and expressly consented
to the discriminatory selection, the law need not be concerned with
protecting their interest in a decision unaffected by the relevant
prejudice, as the parties have no such interest.
' See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
31 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
' To be clear, we are not arguing that such a discriminatory selection of an arbitrator
is likely to result in the empaneling of a prejudiced arbitrator or that a showing of such
discriminatory selection would even come close to being sufficient to demonstrate actual bias
on the part of an arbitrator. See supra notes 317-19 and accompanying text (asserting that
discriminatory selection does not necessarily preclude neutral proceeding). We merely are
asserting that such discriminatory selection makes the empaneling of a prejudiced or biased
arbitrator more likely.
m See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
' Selection of an arbitrator because of his knowledge of Jewish law would not be
discrimination on the basis of religion. Selection of an arbitrator because he is Jewish would
be discrimination on the basis of religion.
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A further unintended harm to the disputant who discriminates
unilaterally or a disputant who has expressly consented to a
discriminatory selection of a decisionmaker is the loss of esteem by
the disputant flowing from the public perception that the dispute
was resolved unfairly.330 We discuss this type of harm more fully
below in considering harms to the community. 31 But whatever
additional and even unintended harms might flow to the disputant
from his own calculated and freely given choice to discriminate
unilaterally or to consent to a "prejudiced" dispute resolution, we
believe that such a disputant has assumed the risk of these harms.
Therefore, the law need not be concerned with protecting the
disputant who discriminates unilaterally or consenting disputants
from these harms.
The law should consider and weigh the disputants' interests that
the State furthers by not proscribing discriminatory selection of an
arbitrator. Disputants who have selected arbitration as the method
for resolving their dispute generally have a strong interest in the
efficient and speedy resolution of their dispute.3 2 The parties may
have opted out of the traditional public court system specifically in
order to reduce the time and financial and emotional costs needed
to resolve their dispute.33
A prohibition on discriminatory selection of the arbitrator might
compromise this interest in efficient and speedy dispute resolution.
Such a prohibition would add an additional ground for seeking to
avoid either a contract calling for arbitration or an arbitration
award that the party finds unsatisfactory. As a result, delays are
possible regardless of whether or not the discrimination was
consensual and, indeed, whether or not any discrimination actually
occurred.
As touched on above, disputants who have expressly consented
to the discriminatory selection of an arbitrator may have done so
m See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,411-13 (1991) ("The discriminatory use ofperemptory
challenges by the prosecution causes a criminal defendant cognizable injury... because racial
discrimination in the selection ofjurors 'casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process'...
and places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt." (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 556 (1979))).
331 See infra notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
u2 See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
3" See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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because they have an interest in seeing that the arbitrator who
decides their case understands and respects their culture and
applies this knowledge and attitude to the resolution of their
dispute.3 4 As one of us has argued elsewhere:
[i]n a variety of contexts, cultural minorities have cause
to fear adjudication of their legal rights and responsibili-
ties in a legal system dominated by majority-culture
personnel (most notably including judges and jurors).
This is particularly true when cultural minorities
attempt to use formal legal processes to give effect to
choices which are inconsistent with prevailing commu-
nity norms. In such cases, the substantive merit of their
legal claims is at risk of being subjugated to
majoritarian values, through a process that relies on
members of the majority culture to vindicate the sub-
stantive rights at issue.335
See E. Gary Spitko, Judge Not: In Defense of Minority-Culture Arbitration, 77 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1065 (1999) (defending merits of minority-culture arbitration) [hereinafter Spitko,
Judge Not]; Spitko, supra note 319 (arguing that minority-culture litigants might avoid
cultural biases of public courts by arbitrating their dispute before arbitration panel whose
membership is selected to maximize likelihood that decisionmakers are sensitive to litigants'
values and beliefs); see also Fred D. Butler, The Question of Race, Gender & Culture in
Mediator Selection, 55 DIsp. RESOL. J. 36,38 (2001) (discussing need for cultural competence"
in mediators and noting that such competence extends beyond having the same race, sex, or
gender as the parties or their advocates--
If you follow the current trend and belief of most lawyers that by using
mediators who possess subject-matter expertise the chances of reaching
resolution is greater, then it only follows that the use of mediators who
understand the culture, race, or gender nuances or possess this expertise
could achieve the same result in racially or culturally charged cases.);
Jessica R. Dominguez, The Role of Latino Culture in Mediation of Family Disputes, 1 J. LEGAL
ADVOC. &PRAC. 154,155 (1999) (discussing importance of lawyers and mediators "recognizing
the different values Latina/o participants bring to the mediation process"); Susan N. Herman,
Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury,
67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1808, 1820 (1993) (citing to empirical evidence supporting notion that
race influences jurors' judgments and commenting that "ifjurors share a defendant's race,
they may be more likely to share some of the defendant's experiences and to understand his
motivations, his context, and his language").
3m Spitko, supra note 319, at 275.
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Discriminatory selection of an arbitrator is a means for minority-
culture disputants to escape from the actual and perceived
majoritarian biases of the public court system.3 38
Moreover, the utility for the disputants in being able to utilize a
minority-culture neutral does not depend entirely upon that neutral
actually understanding the culture at issue better than any
particular neutral from outside the culture. There is added utility
so long as the disputants believe that the neutral enjoys this
understanding.337 A disputant who is arbitrating his dispute before
such a neutral is more likely to accept an adverse outcome if he is
comfortable with the process that he has received. 8' The dispu-
tant's perception that the arbitrator heard and understood his case
likely is essential to this comfort. Thus, where the disputant
believes that an appreciation of and a respect for his minority
culture is critical to an understanding of his case, his belief that the
arbitrator did in fact appreciate and respect that culture will lead
to his greater relative satisfaction with even an adverse arbitration
award. 39
' But see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play and
the Quest for Legitimate Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 993, 1041 (1999)
(arguing that use by cultural minorities of arbitration in attempt to avoid cultural biases of
public court system "will only further cripple the ability of the public courts to earn the trust
and confidence of particular cultural subgroups within the community).
m See Butler, supra note 334, at 38 (positing that, in light of "history of racism, sexism,
and the treatment of other cultures in this society ... the parties may just need to identify
with someone who looks like them... [and] this need should be understood and respected");
Spitko, Judge Not, supra note 334, at 1067-69 (asserting that distrust of judicial system by
some minority-culture litigants arises from not only actual bias but also from perceived bias
and from feared potential bias).
3 See King, supra note 323, at 1183 ("One of the central findings of procedural justice
researchers is that procedures, independent of verdicts and sentences, influence the
acceptance of criminal proceedings."); id. at 1183-84 ("Procedural fairness can persuade
participants and observers to accept an outcome as fair even when that decision is not the one
they would have preferred."); Jethro K Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 431 (1986) ('[If the parties
have personally participated in selecting the neutral, they may be psychologically disposed
to accept his statement of the case, whether it is a binding decision (as in arbitration) or an
advisory opinion (as in a mini-trial)."); id. at 428 (speaking of mini-trial and postulating that
"the presence at the hearing of a neutral advisor, to whom both parties have consented,
enhances the prospect that they will credit any advisory opinion that he renders").
= A similar dynamic holds in mediation. The mediator's likelihood of success in helping
the parties resolve their dispute is in large part a function of his ability to build rapport and
trust with the parties. See JOHN W. COOLEY, THE MEDIATOR'S HANDBOO ADVANCED
PRACTICE GUIDE FOR CIVIL LITIGATION 23 (2000) (positing that mediator will be most effective
1216
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2. The Interests of the Excluded Arbitrator. Discriminatory
selection of an arbitrator also affects the interests of the person or
persons being excluded. The Supreme Court has pointed out that in
the case of a Batson violation, the excluded juror is harmed in two
ways: He is denied participation in jury service for reasons that do
not relate to his ability to serve,340 and he is branded inferior by the
discrimination.341  Both of these means of harm to the
decisionmaker or other neutral are potentially applicable in an
arbitration.
With respect to the first type of harm-denial of the opportunity
to serve for reasons unrelated to ability-the nature of the injury to
the excluded arbitrator is similar in some ways to the nature of the
injury to an excluded juror but differs from it in important ways.
Most significantly, as noted above, jury service, in contrast to
service as an arbitrator, is an important civic right.342 Indeed, the
when the parties feel comfortable sharing with [the mediator] their suggestions for creative
settlement solutions'); Lieberman & Henry, supra note 338, at 428 (noting that successful
mediation requires that parties share intimate facts with mediator and "[bly building on the
parties' trust in the mediator, the process thus allows the parties to explore workable
options[:] With the knowledge that he gains, the mediator can learn how far apart the parties
are and devise ways of bridging the gap"). When the disputants believe that their minority
culture is relevant to an understanding of their dispute, their utilization of a mediator who
they believe appreciates and respects that culture should help build rapport and trust and
tend toward promoting settlement. See Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage"
Through Alternative Dispute Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-
Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1731 (1997) ("The strongest argument for gay
and lesbian mediation, then, may be that couples who feel comfortable that lesbian and gay
mediators are free from bias--even if they are sometimes mistaken in this belief.. .- may
reach better agreements.*). Again, this is likely to be true when the disputants believe that
the neutral enjoys a special understanding of and respect for their culture regardless of
whether he actually appreciates the culture at issue better than any particular neutral from
outside the culture. See id. at 1742 (positing that "[elven apart from whether [gay and
lesbian] couples will face less bias in gay and lesbian mediation, couples may feel more
comfortable and reach better solutions merely because they feel more comfortable"). See also
Butler, supra note 334, at 36 ("It is this empowerment of the parties that makes the
[mediation] process work, and if the parties or their advocates believe that the race, sex, and
gender of the mediator is important, then it is important."); Cynthia R. Mabry, African
Americans "Are Not Carbon Copies" ofWhiteAmericans-The Role ofAfricanAmerican Culture
in Mediation of Family Disputes, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 405, 433 (1998) ("African
Americans who feel that a mediator disrespects them may withdraw or become disruptive.
In either event, the mediation session will be unproductive and efforts to mediate the family's
issues could be thwarted.") (emphasis added).
34 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
841 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
"2 See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court has noted that "with the exception of voting, for
most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most
significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.
As the Supreme Court has balanced the rights of litigants against
the rights of excluded jurors, it has weighed heavily this revered
"honor and privilege" to serve as a juror: One commentator, after
studying the Batson line of cases, concluded:
The United States Supreme Court's recent decisions
reveal an implicit preference for the welfare of the
individual juror, juxtaposed with the unbridled use of
peremptory challenges by a litigant. In making the
determination, the Court necessarily weighed the right
to a fair and impartial jury against the harm to prospec-
tive jurors that are excluded by improper discriminatory
strikes. In the battle between the rights of the litigants
and of those they seek to persuade, the rights of the
noncombatants prevail. 44
That service as an arbitrator is not a revered civic duty and honor
is itself an important justification for a reweighing of interests in
the private dispute resolution context. One must add to the scale (in
addition to the interests of the disputants discussed above and the
interests of the community discussed below) two additional interests
that the potential arbitrator has in avoiding discriminatory
selection. First, unlike a potential juror, the potential arbitrator in
many cases will have a significant pecuniary interest in serving as
an arbitrator. 45 And second, similar to a potential juror, and as the
Supreme Court has noted in the juror context, the potential
arbitrator has an interest in not being branded inferior by the
discrimination.4
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).
3, Elaine A. Carlson, Batson, J.E.B., and Beyond: The Paradoxical Quest for Reasoned
Peremptory Strikes in the Jury Selection Process, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 947, 1003 (1994).
3" 1 EDMONDSON, supra note 191, § 5.12 (noting that arbitrators may charge reasonable
fees for their services).
3' See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing brand of inferiority placed on
juror who is subject of discrimination).
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It seems that a disputant's motive for engaging in discriminatory
selection of an arbitrator is a critical factor attaching to the weight
that should be given to all of these interests that a potential
arbitrator has in avoiding discriminatory selection and, importantly,
also to the weight that should be given to the disputants' interest in
engaging in such discrimination. We believe that a disputant's
interest in discriminatory selection is least worthy of recognition
when the motive for the discrimination is an animus toward the
potential arbitrator's race or another protected characteristic. We
further believe that the disputants' interest in discriminatory
selection is most worthy of recognition when the motive for the
discrimination is ensuring that the arbitrator understands and
respects their culture and is able to apply this knowledge to the
resolution of their dispute. 4" Thus, where two heterosexual
disputants discriminate against a lesbian arbitrator because of an
animus toward lesbians, we would not highly value the disputants'
interest in discriminatory selection. Where two lesbian disputants
seek out a lesbian arbitrator to resolve their child custody and
visitation dispute, we would highly value their interest in the
discriminatory selection.3"
An inverse relationship exists between the strength of the
disputant's interests in discriminatory selection and the strength of
the potential arbitrator's interest in avoiding discriminatory
selection. That is, as the disputant's legitimate interest increases,
the potential arbitrator's legitimate interest decreases. Where the
disputant's interest in discriminatory selection is weakest-when
the disputant is motivated by an animus toward the potential
arbitrator's race or relationship to some other protected character-
istic-the potential neutral is clearly being excluded for reasons
wholly unrelated to his ability to serve, and, relatedly, he is most
strongly branded inferior by the discrimination. Thus, the two
"' See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335 (2003) ("Just as growing up in a particular
region or having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's views,
so too is one's own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in
which race unfortunately still matters.").
3, See Spitko, supra note 5, at 1140-54 (explicating utility of child custody and visitation
arbitration for lesbian co-parents and suggesting that lesbian "couple would be able to guard
against some anti-minority ignorance and bias in the public court system by selecting an
arbitrator who is familiar with lesbian co-parented families").
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interests of an excluded juror that the Supreme Court has identified
in the Batson context are most strongly implicated. 4 9
But where the disputants' interest in discriminatory selection is
strongest-when the motive for the discrimination is ensuring that
the arbitrator understands and respects their culture and is able to
apply this knowledge to the resolution of their dispute-the
discriminatory selection is least likely to brand the excluded
arbitrator as inferior, and relatedly, it is arguable that the excluded
arbitrator has not been denied an opportunity to serve because of
reasons unrelated to his ability to serve. As noted above, when the
disputants believe that their minority culture is relevant to the
resolution of their dispute, their confidence that the neutral enjoys
a special appreciation of their minority culture may be critical to the
settlement of their dispute or the parties' acceptance of an arbi-
trated resolution of their dispute.35 Exclusion under such circum-
stances does not send a powerful message of inferiority relating to
the excluded neutral. In contrast, exclusion of a potential arbitrator
on the basis of sexual orientation in the context of a commercial
dispute between two homophobic disputants does send a powerful
message of inferiority.
In general, therefore, we believe that, in balancing the interests
of the disputants against those of a potential arbitrator relating to
discriminatory selection of an arbitrator, the argument for allowing
discriminatory selection of an arbitrator is strongest when the
disputants have expressly consented to the discriminatory selection
and the nature of the discrimination is related to the nature of the
dispute. Still, there is another set of interests-those of the
community-that should be taken into account. We consider those
interests next.
3. The Interests of the Community. Discriminatory selection of an
arbitrator also potentially impacts the larger community beyond the
litigants and the excluded arbitrator. The Supreme Court has
identified two harms that it has found the community suffers with
respect to a Batson violation in juror selection: First, this practice
349 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
'o See supra notes 334-39 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of selecting
minority-culture arbitrator).
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perpetuates invidious stereotypes about the abilities of the excluded
group.8 1 Second, this practice undermines public confidence in our
system ofjustice.3 52 This is a serious charge. One might reasonably
fear that this lessened confidence, in turn, might lead to a lessened
obedience to law. 53
With respect to this first type of harm, discriminatory selection
of an arbitrator in a private dispute resolution has the potential to
perpetuate invidious stereotypes no less than discriminatory
selection of ajuror 54 As discussed above, discriminatory selection
of an arbitrator motivated by animus toward a protected character-
istic sends a message of inferiority955 -a message that certainly has
the potential to perpetuate invidious stereotypes. For the reasons
set out above, however, the potential for this type of harm is much
less where the discriminatory selection is motivated by the dispu-
tants' efforts to select an arbitrator informed about a culture that is
relevant to resolution of their dispute.
86
With respect to the second type of harm, the Supreme Court has
noted that the public's confidence in our system of justice is
undermined when it comes to believe that "the 'deck has been
stacked' in favor of one side" through inclusion of a partial jury.357
This means of harming the community's sense of justice travels
largely intact into the context of an arbitration proceeding. For
example, consider again our Non-Consensual Scenario, where the
employer/respondent in a religious discrimination lawsuit has
struck from the arbitration panel the sole arbitrator whom the
employer perceives shares the employee/complainant's religious
' See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
See King, supra note 323, at 1180 n.12.
While theorists continue to debate whether law-abiding behavior is
related to 'trust' or 'legitimacy' or to anything other than habit and self-
interest, I am persuaded that the perceived legitimacy of legal institutions
has an independent effect on obedience to law, even if that effect is not as
significant as that of education or economic security.
Id.
We believe the public is less likely, however, to learn of the discriminatory selection
of an arbitrator as contrasted with the discriminatory selection of a juror, given the private
nature of arbitration.
36 See supra notes 346-50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 346-50 and accompanying text.
'7 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994).
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affiliation. Assuming that the public learns of this incident (or
comes to know of others like it), the public's confidence in arbitra-
tion as an alternative yet fair process for dispute resolution might
well be undermined.
We would not expect to see the same effect, however, in a case
such as the Consensual Scenario. Where both disputants have
expressly consented to the discriminatory selection of an arbitrator;
the deck, even if the disputants have "stacked" it, presumably favors
neither side in a way that is apparent. (Otherwise, the disputants
would not both have expressly consented to the process.) Where a
Jewish husband and wife agree that a panel of Jewish arbitrators
will decide their divorce and custody dispute, the community will
not perceive that the process unfairly favors either side. Because
the community should not perceive that the deck has been stacked
in favor of either side, this means of undermining the community's
confidence in our system ofjustice is inapposite in a case such as the
Consensual Scenario. Indeed, the community might even view the
consensual discriminatory selection of an arbitrator as adding to the
fairness of the dispute resolution proceeding if the community
understands that the selection increases the chances that the
arbitrator will apply the appropriate values to his resolution of the
dispute."5
A second way in which discriminatory juror selection undermines
the public's confidence in our system of justice is by lessening the
community's voice in a public court proceeding. The public properly
understands the jury as representing community interests and
" See Daniel W. Van Ness, Preserving a Community Voice: The Case for Half-and-Half
Juries inRacially-Charged Criminal Cases, 28 J. MARSHALLL. REV. 1, 49 (1994) (arguing that
"just" verdicts result from ascertainment of true facts in case and application of law to those
facts "in a way which is congruent with the customs, norms and values of the community");
see also King, supra note 323, at 1184 ("[Tlhere is some support for the claim that jury
representativeness is one of those features that matters most to people when assessing the
fairness ofjury proceedings."); id. at 1181, 1188 (noting empirical research that suggests that
racially representative juries enhance perceptions of jury fairness but commenting that
empirical research does not speak to issues of how community would view race-based means
for achieving that representativeness or how knowledge of such race-based means would
impact perceptions of jury fairness).
[Vol. 38:11451222
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values in criminal and civil litigation.35 9  Discriminatory juror
selection misrepresents the community and distorts its voice.
This lessened and distorted voice itself undermines public
confidence in the public system of justice. One commentator has
explained the direct relationship between a lessened public voice in
the justice system and a lessened public confidence in that system:
To be accepted, any system of adjudicating disputes
must be seen by the parties as credible and just on a
consistent basis. While credibility of the system is
clearly connected to the perceived justice of its verdicts,
the two qualities are not the same. A verdict perceived
as just may emanate from a judicial system which has
no credibility. On the other hand, an institution which
produces an unjust verdict will not be repudiated if the
mistaken verdict is seen as an exception to a series of
essentially correct verdicts. What distinguishes the two
qualities is that credibility addresses matters of compo-
sition and procedure, while the justice of verdicts
emphasizes the outcome of the process. Including a
community voice enhances the likelihood that the
community will perceive the judicial system as credible
and just.3 6 0
3' See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,600 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("At
the time of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was well understood that punitive
damages represent the assessment by the jury, as the voice of the community, of the measure
of punishment the defendant deserved."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)
("Fear of unchecked power, so typical ofour State and Federal Governments in other respects,
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the
determination of guilt or innocence."); United States v. Means, 409 F. Supp. 115,117 (D.N.D.
1976) (denying change of venue, in part because "[tihe interest of a community that those
charged with violations of its laws, be tried in that community, is not a matter to be cast aside
lightly"); Lisa Kern Griffin, "The Image We See Is Our Own": Defending the Jury's Territory
at the Heart of the Democratic Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 332, 334 ("The jury represents the
public's interests, but the deliberative process also tempers the anger and fear of the
community and protects individual defendants from hasty judgments."); Van Ness, supra note
358, at 5, 11-12 ([A] significant role of the jury from its inception has been to represent the
interests and values of the community.").
60 Van Ness, supra note 358, at 47.
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Unlike the harm of eroded public confidence, this second means
of harming the community's sense ofjustice does not travel well into
the context of an arbitration proceeding. To state the point most
strongly, the public is not entitled to a voice in a private dispute
resolution. To state the point less strongly, certainly the public is
less entitled to a voice in a private dispute resolution relative to a
jury proceeding.16 1
The reasoning of the appellate court in United States v. Nelson 1
2
is instructive: In Nelson, the district court judge was concerned that
the jury was not sufficiently racially and religiously diverse."'3 With
the parties' consent, the judge removed a white juror and replaced
that juror and also an ill juror with a Jewish juror and an African-
American one, in front of two non-African-American, non-Jewish
jurors who were next in line."'
The appeals court held that what the district court had done was
improper under Batson in light of the important public significance
of the jury.3 6
[AlIthough the motives behind the district court's race-
and religion-based jury selection procedures were
undoubtedly meant to be tolerant and inclusive rather
than bigoted and exclusionary, that fact cannot justify
the district court's race-conscious actions. The signifi-
cance of a jury in our polity as a body chosen apart from
racial and religious manipulations is too great to permit
categorization by race or religion even from the best of
intentions.366
The appeals court went on to opine that such consensual
discriminatory selection of a decisionmaker would be acceptable,
however, in a private arbitration because of the lessened public
interest in a private dispute resolution proceeding:
.. See supra note 359 and accompanying text (describing public interest injury system).
0 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002).
*0 Id. at 207-08.
64 Id.
"6 Id.
366 Id.
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Of course, parties can, in appropriate situations, opt out
of the judicial system-say by agreeing to arbitration.
And if they do so, they can choose arbiters of whatever
racial or religious sorts they wish. But that is totally
different from bending the judicial system to their racial
and religious preferences. For, unlike private institu-
tions, the judicial system belongs not to the parties but
to the nation.1
6 7
It is this lessened community interest in private adjudication as
contrasted with the public's interest in a public proceeding involving
a jury that makes consensual discrimination in the context of an
arbitration proceeding so much less objectionable than in the
context of a public jury trial. While the jury traditionally has
represented the community's interests and values in litigation, an
arbitrator should not be viewed this way. Discriminatory selection
of an arbitrator, therefore, impacts less the public voice. Conse-
quently, such discriminatory selection in a private dispute resolu-
tion has less potential for undermining the public's confidence in the
private system of justice. We believe, therefore, that there is a
compelling argument for allowing parties to consent to a discrimina-
tory selection of an arbitrator in certain circumstances, provided
that no state or federal employment discrimination statute is
implicated.3"
Id. at 208-09.
See Smith v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Inc., 233 F.3d 502, 504-05 (7th Cir. 2000)
[W]e do not suppose that there is anything in the law that would forbid
private parties to stipulate to a mode of private dispute resolution that
specified a particular gender composition of the tribunal, assuming the
arbitrators are not employees of the American Arbitration Association or
of some other dispute-resolution agency conducting the arbitration, which
might bring Title VII into play.
Id.; see also Lamv. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1560 n.13 (9th Cir. 1994) (MThe existence
of... third party preferences for discrimination does not, of course, justify discriminatory
hiring practices."); Olsen v. Marriott Intl, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1065 (D. Ariz. 1999)
(noting that "[clourts have consistently rejected requests for a BFOQ based on customer
preference" and discussing case law on point).
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V. A MODEL STATUTE RESPECTING DISCRIMINATORY
SELECTION OF AN ARBITRATOR
A. TEXT OF THE PROPOSED STATUTE
In light of the policies we have discussed above and for the
additional reasons set out below, we propose the following amend-
ment to the Federal Arbitration Act and the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act (2000):
Section [171 [34] :319 Impermissible Discrimination in the Selection
of an Arbitrator.
(a) [Prohibition.] No party to an arbitration shall discriminate
in the selection of an arbitrator on the basis of the arbitrator's race,
ethnicity, national origin, sex, religion, or sexual orientation.
(b) [Exception to the Prohibition.]
(1) The prohibition in Subsection (a) shall not apply in a case in
which all disputants who are parties to the arbitration expressly
consent to the discrimination and where the basis for the discrimi-
nation is pertinent to a material issue in the case.
(2) Parties to a tripartite arbitration agreement, which calls for
each party to appoint one arbitrator to a three-arbitrator panel and
for those two party-appointed arbitrators to select the third member
of the arbitration panel, shall be deemed to have consented to the
discriminatory selection of the arbitrators.
(c) [Standing.]
(1) One who is excluded from serving as an arbitrator in an
arbitration shall have standing to demonstrate that such exclusion
is in violation of this Section.
(2) A disputant who is a party to an arbitration shall have
standing to demonstrate that an adverse disputant's selection or
exclusion of an arbitrator is in violation of this Section.
(d) [Standard of Proof.] One who seeks a remedy under this
Section must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
369 This section would be Section 17 if added to the end of the Federal Arbitration Act and
would be Section 34 if added to the end of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act.
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selection or exclusion of the relevant arbitrator is in violation of this
Section.
(e) [Remedies.]
(1) One who proves by clear and convincing evidence that he or
she was excluded from serving as an arbitrator in an arbitration in
violation of this Section may be awarded compensatory damages.
Such money damages shall be his or her sole remedy.
(2) A disputant who is a party to an arbitration who proves by
clear and convincing evidence that an adverse disputant's selection
or exclusion of an arbitrator is in violation of this Section shall be
entitled to vacatur of any arbitration ruling or award entered by
that arbitrator or a panel on which that arbitrator served. The
court shall then remand the case for further arbitration proceedings
consistent with this Section. The court may award costs to the
moving party incurred because of the arbitrator selection or
exclusion in violation of this Section. The court may award costs to
the responding party incurred because of the motion if the court
finds that the motion when filed lacked probable cause.
(3) A respondent to a motion to compel arbitration who proves
by clear and convincing evidence that the arbitration contract calls
for or allows for an adverse disputant's selection or exclusion of an
arbitrator in violation of this Section shall be entitled to an order
enjoining such discriminatory selection or exclusion. The court, if
convinced that a contract to arbitrate exists, shall then order
arbitration proceedings consistent with this Section.
(f) [Process. ]
(1) A disputant who is a party to an arbitration who has reason
to believe that an adverse disputant's selection or exclusion of an
arbitrator is in violation of this Section must notify the adverse
disputant within seven days of his or her first having reason for
such belief that he or she intends to challenge that selection.
Failure to so notify the adverse disputant shall constitute waiver of
any claim under this Section.
(2) A disputant who is a party to an arbitration who has reason
to believe that an adverse disputant's selection or exclusion of an
arbitrator is in violation of this Section must seek a hearing on the
matter before the arbitrator or arbitration panel within fourteen
days of his or her first having reason for such belief or within
20041 1227
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fourteen days of the assignment of an arbitrator or arbitration panel
to the case, whichever is later. Failure to move for such a hearing
within this time frame shall constitute waiver of any claim under
this Section, unless a final arbitration award is entered in the case
prior to the expiration of the relevant fourteen-day period.
(3) Upon request from a disputant for a hearing on the matter
of arbitrator selection alleged to be in violation of this Section, the
arbitrator or arbitration panel shall hear evidence in the matter
including testimony under oath from the attorneys and disputants
involved in the alleged discriminatory selection or exclusion.
(4) If the arbitrator or arbitration panel is convinced by clear
and convincing evidence that selection or exclusion of an arbitrator
in the case is in violation of this Section, the arbitrator or arbitra-
tion panel shall order selection consistent with this Section of a
replacement arbitrator or arbitrators for any arbitrator affected by
such discriminatory selection and shall order removal of any
arbitrator affected by such discriminatory selection. The arbitrator
or arbitration panel may also award costs to the moving party
incurred because of the arbitrator selection or exclusion in violation
of this Section.
(5) A claim under this Section (by either an arbitrator or a
disputant) may not be brought to a court before a final arbitration
award is entered in the case. A claim under this Section (by either
an arbitrator or a disputant) may not be brought to a court more
than thirty days after a final arbitration award is entered in the
case.
B. DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED STATUTE
Our proposed statute would ban discrimination in the selection
of an arbitrator on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex,
religion, or sexual orientation. In selecting these classifications, we
have sought largely to mirror the classifications that the Batson
principle encompasses. The sexual orientation classification
arguably fits outside of the Batson principle under existing case law.
We have included the sexual orientation classification within our
prohibition, nevertheless, for the reasons set out below.
1228 [Vol. 38:1145
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The Supreme Court has applied the Batson principle only in the
context of race and sex discrimination. 7 The Court has not
considered the Batson principle in any other context. The Court's
holdings and dicta in the Batson line of cases strongly suggest,
however, that the Court would extend the Batson principle to other
classifications that merit heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause but would not extend the principle beyond such
classifications.
The Supreme Court stated in dicta in J.E.B. that "[plarties
may... exercise their peremptory challenges to remove from the
venire any group or class of individuals normally subject to 'rational
basis' review." 71 This dicta and the reasoning of Batson and J.E.B.
suggest that the converse would hold: The Batson principle should
extend to proscribe peremptory challenges on the basis of classifica-
tions, such as ethnicity, national origin, and religion, that receive
heightened scrutiny in an equal protection challenge. 72 As
370 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,96-98(1986) (proscribing intentional discrimina-
tion on basis of race in exercise of peremptory challenge); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex tel. T.B., 511
U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (extending Batson principle to proscribe intentional discrimination on
basis of sex in exercise of peremptory challenge).
37 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143.
' See Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1117 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
In breaking the barrier between classifications that merit strict equal
protection scrutiny and those that receive what we have termed height-
ened' or 'intermediate' scrutiny, J.E.B. would seem to have extended
Batson's equal protection analysis to all strikes based on the latter
category of classification-a category which presumably would include
classifications based on religion.
Id.; J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 161 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that reasoning of J.E.B. suggests
that Equal Protection Clause forbids exercise of peremptory challenge based on religion);
United States v. Somerstein, 959 F. Supp. 592, 595 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
[Tihe same 'message' that the Supreme Court hoped to avoid with its
decision to applyBatson to gender based peremptory strikes, namely that
women would be unfit 'to decide important questions upon which
reasonable persons could disagree,' is no less offensive to the notions of
equal protection when applied to other classes which receive heightened
scrutiny, which would presumably include religious denominations.
Id.; Underwood, supra note 291, at 765-66 (concluding that "(tihe ban on peremptory
challenges based on group stereotypes should apply... to the small number of classifications
that are suspect in the same way that race is: national origin,.. . religion, and probably
gender, but probably not age, disability, occupation, education, or wealth").
The lower federal courts and the state courts that have considered the issue, however,
have not been of one mind and have not uniformly so held. The courts have split over
whether to permit a peremptory strike based on a potential juror's religious affiliation, as
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Justice Scalia commented (disapprovingly) in dissent in J.E.B.,
"[tihe core of the Court's reasoning [in J.E.B.1 is that peremptory
distinguished from his religious beliefs. Compare People v. Martin, 64 Cal. App. 4th 378,385
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that Equal Protection Clause prohibits exercise of peremptory
challenge on basis of religious affiliation but not religious belief), State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d
531, 552-53 (Conn. 1999) (distinguishing between discrimination on basis of religious
affiliation and discrimination on basis of religious belief and holding that Equal Protection
Clause prohibits exercise of peremptory challenge on basis of venireperson's religious
affiliation but not such strike based on his religious belief), and Thorson v. State, 721 So. 2d
590,595 (Miss. 1998) (holding, based solely on Mississippi constitution and statutory law, that
it is permissible for "a party to strike a potential juror for her actual beliefs, even if that belief
springs from her religion, [but] we will not allow challenges based solely on a potential jurors'
religious affiliation"), with State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (finding that
.religious bigotry in the use of the peremptory challenge is not as prevalent, or flagrant, or
historically ingrained in the jury selection process as is race" and holding that neither United
States nor Minnesota constitutions requires extending Batson principle to religion), and
Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468,496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (conflating religious affiliation
and religious belief and holding that discrimination in jury selection on basis of personal
belief (and, therefore, religion) is permissible). See also United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d
1076, 1086 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Whether Jewish jurors are viewed as members of a 'race'...
or a religion, a defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges against them is subject to
Batson's strictures."). While not disagreeing that Batson should extend to some discrimina-
tion based on ethnicity, courts have disagreed as to which particular ethnic groups should
qualify for Batson protection. Compare United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96, 102
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (concluding that "the Court in Batson meant 'cognizable racial groups' to
include a variety of ethnic and ancestral groups subject to intentional discrimination,
including Italian-Americans"), with United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 23 (1st Cir. 2002)
(rejecting defendant's Batson challenge where defendant failed to show that Italian-
Americans "are a group that faced or faces systematic discrimination").
Conversely, some courts have extendedBatson-like protections to proscribe peremptory
challenges on the basis of a classification that has not received heightened equal protection
scrutiny. See People v. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1272-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (becoming
first court to proscribe exercise of peremptory challenge on basis of sexual orientation but
basing its holding on provision of California constitution comparable to Sixth Amendment of
United States Constitution rather than on equal protection principles); People v. Green, 561
N.Y.S.2d 130, 133 (1990) (holding that peremptory challenge based on potential juror's
deafness lacked rational basis and, therefore, violated such potential juror's right to equal
protection under New York State constitution); see also A.B. 2418,1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2000) (codified at CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 204,231.5 (West Supp. 2004) (codifying Garcia and
expanding it to prohibit the use of peremptory strike based on potential juror's sexual
orientation); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 758 (Cal. 1978) (stating that "the right to trial
by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community is guaranteed equally
and independently by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and by article 1,
section 16, of the California Constitution"); Kathryn Ann Barry, Striking Back Against
Homophobia: Prohibiting Peremptory Strikes Based on Sexual Orientation, 16 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 157, 162-71 (2001) (discussing Garcia decision and its arguable shortcomings).
For a discussion of the extent to which a juror's sexual orientation is an appropriate topic for
voir dire questioning and a permissible basis for a peremptory strike, see generally Vanessa
H. Eisemann, Striking a Balance of Fairness: Sexual Orientation and Voir Dire, 13 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 1 (2001).
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challenges on the basis of any group characteristic subject to
heightened scrutiny are inconsistent with the guarantee of the
Equal Protection Clause.""'
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether sexual orienta-
tion classifications merit heightened equal protection scrutiny.3 74
One of us has argued elsewhere that sexual orientation classifica-
tions should receive such heightened scrutiny, as gays and lesbians
have suffered a long history of discrimination even though their
sexual orientation bears no relationship to their ability to contribute
to society. 75 The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas, 76 which overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,"' has strengthened
this argument immensely. 78 Our proposed statute, therefore, is
'73 J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 159 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34 InRomer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,631-36 (1996), the Supreme Court applied a rational
basis review in invalidating a Colorado constitutional amendment which announced and
prescribed that gay people shall not have any particular protections under the law of
Colorado. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32. The issue of whether sexual orientation classifications
merit heightened scrutiny was not argued to the Court, and the Court had no need to decide
the issue, given its holding that Colorado's amendment failed even rational basis review. See
id. at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that respondents did not appeal trial court's
rejection of their argument "that homosexuals constitute a 'suspect' or 'quasi-suspect' class").
37" See E. Gary Spitko, A Biologic Argument for Gay Essentialism.Determinism:
Implications for Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 571,598-
620(1996).
370 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003) ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided, is not
correct today and is hereby overruled.").
"' 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding sodomy law).
' See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482 ("Equality of treatment and the due process right to
demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests."). The federal
courts of appeals that have considered whether sexual orientation classifications merit
heightened scrutiny have decided this question in the negative. See, e.g., Spitko, supra note
375, at 607-20 (citing and discussing case law). Those courts that have explained their
holding have relied on Bowers v. Hardwick to support their conclusion that classifications
based on sexual orientation are not suspect. See Equality Found. v. Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261,
268 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Bowers v. Hardwick and its progeny command that, as a matter of law,
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals cannot constitute either a 'suspect class' or a 'quasi-suspect
class.' "); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("If the government can
criminalize homosexual conduct, a group that is defined by reference to that conduct cannot
constitute a 'suspect class.'") (citing Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("If the
Court [in Bowers v. Hardwick] was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the
behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state
sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious.'); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990)
(If for federal analysis we must reach equal protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment... and
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consistent with the position that sexual orientation classifications
merit heightened equal protection scrutiny.
Our proposal to ban discrimination on these bases in most
circumstances reflects our weighing of the relevant interests of
society, potential arbitrators, and disputants relating to
discriminatory selection, discussed fully in Part IV above.3 79 Society
has interests in overcoming invidious stereotypes and in
maintaining public confidence in our system of dispute resolution.'80
The potential arbitrator may have a pecuniary interest in serving on
the case.38' He also has an interest in not being branded inferior by
the discrimination.8 2 Finally, the disputants have an interest in
reducing the likelihood that their arbitral proceeding and the
arbitrator's final decision will be affected by invidious
discrimination3 e and also have an interest in the public perception
that they have resolved their dispute in a fair manner.
84
if there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment... it would be incongru-
ous to expand the reach ofequal protection to find a fundamental right of
homosexual conduct under the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.);
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989) (*If homosexual conduct may
constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-
suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes.
The Constitution, in light of Hardwick, cannot otherwise be rationally applied, lest an
unjustified and indefensible inconsistency result."); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d
1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("After Hardwick, it cannot logically be asserted that discrimina-
tion against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm.'); see also Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d
256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting contention that "homosexuality is a suspect
classification ... for the reasons stated by the Fourth Circuit in Thomasson [v. Perry]");
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915,928 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating without applying any criteria
for qualification as suspect class that "[a] class comprised of service members who engage in
or have a propensity to engage in [homosexual] acts is not inherently suspect" and citing
Steffan v. Perry). Lawrence v. Texas dismantled this equal protection case law simultaneously
as it overturned Bowers on due process grounds.
'" See supra notes 247-368 and accompanying text.
3w See supra notes 351-58 and accompanying text (analyzing community interests in non-
discriminatory selection of arbitrator).
38 See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 340-50 and accompanying text (analyzing interests of excluded
arbitrator).
w See supra notes 324-27 and accompanying text.
3m See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
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Against these interests, we weigh the disputants' interest in an
efficient and expeditious resolution of their dispute.8 5 We are
mindful that a ban on invidious discrimination in the selection of an
arbitrator adds an avenue for appeal from an arbitrator's ruling and
threatens to introduce additional costs and delays into the arbitra-
tion process."' Nevertheless, we have concluded that, in light of the
interests discussed above, the scales tip in favor of banning
invidious discrimination in the selection of an arbitrator.
The disputants' mutual, express consent to the discriminatory
selection of an arbitrator, however, alters the weighing of relevant
interests. As an initial matter with respect to consent, we consider
the parties to a tripartite arbitration agreement to have consented
to the discriminatory selection of the arbitrators. A tripartite
arbitration agreement calls for each party to appoint one arbitrator
to a three-arbitrator panel and for those two party-appointed
arbitrators to select the third member of the arbitration panel,
known as the "neutral."3S? The parties who agree to such a scheme
accept that the opposing party may appoint even an arbitrator
predisposed toward it.' Thus, the parties have consented to
allowing the opposing party to appoint an arbitrator whom the
appointing party calculates will favor it for whatever reason. As
Professor Thomas Carbonneau has explained:
It is generally assumed that the party-appointed arbitra-
tors, although they may be required or expected to act
impartially, will favor the designating party's case,
leaving the neutral arbitrator to cast the deciding vote.
The general expectation is that a party-designated
arbitrator will represent its party's interest in the
See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
'8 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 57, at 6.
3m See SPECIAL COMM. ABA & COMM. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N CODE OF ETHICS FOR
ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon VII(AX1) (1997) (providing that party-
appointed arbitrators "may be predisposed toward the party who appointed them but in all
other respects are obligated to act in good faith and with integrity and fairness'); see also
Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that parties
to tripartite arbitration agreement "can ask [for] no more impartiality than inheres in the
method they have chosen").
2004] 1233
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 1233 2003-2004
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
deliberations. This situation sometimes leads to
"arbitrations-within-arbitrations," in which the party-
appointed arbitrators make their case to the neutral
arbitrator.8 9
Where the disputants have consented to a tripartite arbitration
scheme or have expressly consented to the discriminatory selection
of an arbitrator, the disputants themselves no longer can assert an
interest in an arbitral process and decision unaffected by the
relevant prejudice.3 9 0  Relatedly, society is unlikely to view an
arbitration involving consensual discrimination as unfair to or
"stacked against" either disputant. 91 Such consensual discrimina-
tion is less likely, therefore, to undermine public confidence in our
system of dispute resolution.
Where the discrimination is pertinent to a material issue in the
case, the disputants may have a legitimate interest in selecting an
arbitrator who understands and respects their culture and is likely
to apply this knowledge and attitude toward the resolution of their
dispute. 92 In such a case, the discrimination is less likely to brand
the excluded arbitrator as inferior.9 3 Relatedly, in such a case, the
discrimination is less likely to perpetuate invidious stereotypes.3 9'
For all these reasons, we find the case for allowing discriminatory
selection to be stronger when the disputants have expressly
consented to the discrimination. When the consensual discrimina-
tion is also pertinent to a material issue in the case, we find the
disputants' interests in such discrimination to be sufficiently
important and the interests of society and the excluded arbitrator
to be sufficiently attenuated that such discrimination should be
allowed. Our proposed statute, therefore, excludes from the general
prohibition against discriminatory selection of an arbitrator those
cases in which all disputants who are parties to the arbitration
expressly consent to the discriminatory selection and where the
3" CARBONNEAU, supra note 57, at 6.
" See supra notes 325-31 and accompanying text.
391 See supra notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
"2 See supra notes 328-29 and 334-39 and accompanying texts.
3 See supra notes 347-50 and accompanying text.
3 See supra notes 354-56 and accompanying text.
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basis for the discrimination is pertinent to a material issue in the
case.
Once the fact finder determines the type of discrimination at
issue (for example, race discrimination or sex discrimination), the
determination as to whether the discrimination was pertinent to a
material issue in the case should be made on the basis of objective
evidence, such as the pleadings or testimony in the case. The
determination does not call for a subjective inquiry into the
motivation for the discrimination (beyond identifying the category
of discrimination). Specifically, the determination does not call for
a separation of discrimination based on animus from discrimination
based on a desire to gain greater cultural sensitivity ("bad" discrimi-
nation versus "good" discrimination). Such a subjective inquiry
would unreasonably undermine the efficiency of arbitration.
Along this last line, we have tried throughout to craft a statute
that will minimize the potential for additional disruptions, delays,
and costs resulting from the ban on discriminatory selection of an
arbitrator. Foremost, our proposed statute respects the disputants'
bargain in favor of arbitration. Under our proposed statute, the
statutory remedy for a disputant who proves by clear and convincing
evidence that its adversary impermissibly discriminated in the
selection of an arbitrator is vacatur of an arbitration award and
remand for further arbitration proceedings consistent with the
statute.395 A party to an arbitration contract, therefore, may not
ever use our proposed statute to evade the arbitration contract and
obtain a judicial resolution of the primary dispute.
3" See Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511 (2001).
[E]stablished law ordinarily precludes a court from resolving the merits
of the parties' dispute on the basis of its own factual determinations, no
matter how erroneous the arbitrator's decision .... Even when the
arbitrator's award may properly be vacated, the appropriate remedy is to
remand the case for further arbitration proceedings.
Id.; United Paperworkers Int'l v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40-41 n.10 (1987).
Even in the very rare instances when an arbitrator's procedural aberra-
tions rise to the level of affirmative misconduct, as a rule the court must
not foreclose further proceedings by settling the merits according to its
own judgement of the appropriate result [as this) would improperly
substitute a judicial determination for the arbitrator's decision that the
parties bargained for....
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Our proposed statute requires that a disputant who comes to
have reason to believe that its adversary has selected or struck an
arbitrator on an impermissible basis notify its adversary within
seven days and seek a hearing before the arbitrator on the matter
within fourteen days of its first having reason for such belief. We
believe that in most cases this will require a party to act at or very
near the time of arbitrator selection or else forfeit its claim. Thus,
the requirement of early notice to the adversary will allow the
adversary who has violated this Section to admit its violation of the
statute and allow for consensual replacement of the arbitrator at an
early stage of the proceedings. In the alternative, the requirement
of an early appeal to the arbitrator with respect to the alleged
discriminatory selection will allow for replacement of the arbitrator
at an early stage of the proceedings where the arbitrator finds that
his selection was in violation of this Section.39
Conversely, our proposed statute would not allow a disputant to
challenge in court the selection or striking of an arbitrator until
after the arbitrator has entered a final arbitration award. Any
earlier court challenge would unreasonably disrupt and delay the
arbitration proceedings. The claim that the arbitrator is tainted by
an impermissible selection should be treated like a claim that an
arbitrator labors under an impermissible bias. Such a claim may
only be brought after entry of a final arbitration award. 97 We find
the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in relation to this precise issue to be persuasive:
The time to challenge an arbitration, on whatever
grounds, including bias, is when the arbitration is
completed and an award rendered. To allow a party to
bring an independent suit to enjoin the arbitration is
inconsistent with fundamental procedural principles
See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[Fairness
objections should generally be made to the arbitrator, subject only to limited post-arbitration
judicial review as set forth in section 10 of the FAA.*).
m See Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411,414 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting
that "it is well established that a district court cannot entertain an attack upon the
qualifications or partiality of arbitrators until after the conclusion of the arbitration and the
rendition of an award' and citing cases so holding).
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that apply with even greater force to arbitration than to
conventional litigation. If during jury voir dire a Batson
objection to the exercise of a peremptory challenge is
rejected by the trial judge, the disappointed litigant
cannot bring a suit to enjoin the litigation .... The
choice of arbitration is a choice to trade off certain
procedural safeguards, such as appellate review, against
hoped-for savings in time and expense (other than the
expense of the tribunal), a measure of procedural
simplicity and informality, and a differently constituted
tribunal. That choice would be disrupted by allowing a
party to arbitration to obtain an interlocutory appeal to
a federal district court. 398
Our proposed statute imposes on the movant a high burden of
proof so that an arbitration award may not be lightly overturned:
The movant must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
opposing party selected or struck an arbitrator based on a protected
characteristic. The nature of arbitrator selection, particularly the
process relating to peremptory strikes in arbitration, will make this
a more difficult task in many cases as contrasted with a Batson
challenge in the context ofjuror selection. For example, arbitration
procedure often allows for only one peremptory strike per side. 9 In
m Smith v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 233 F.3d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
m See NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE R. 21(B) (2003) ("Each Party
making an appearance may notify the Director in writing.. . striking one of the [Arbitrator]
candidates."); NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, DEPARTMENT OF ARBITRATION: ARTICLE XI NYSE
CONSTIUIMON AND ARRATON RULES, R 609(a) ("In any arbitration proceeding, each party shall
have the right to one peremptory challenge.", NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURiTIES DEALERS,
CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE (2003), R. 10311(a) ("In an arbitration proceeding... each party
shall have the right to one peremptory challenge."). But see AMMICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
PATENT ARBITRATION RULES IR 12 (2003) ("In a single-arbitrator case, each party may strike three
names on a peremptory basis. In a multi-arbitrator case, each party may strike five names on a
peremptory basis.", AMERICAN ARBITRATION RULES MEDIATION AND ARBrRATION RULES art 7(2)
("In a single arbitrator case, each party will receive an identical list of ten names from which each
party may strike three names on a peremptory basis. In a multi-arbitrator case, each party will
receive an identical list of fifteen names from which each party may strike five names on a
peremptory basis."). Court-ordered arbitration procedures also commonly allow only one
peremptory strike per side. See D. ARIZ. Or. R. PRAC. 2.11(dX2) ("Each side is limited to one
peremptory strike during the pendency of the case.") ARIz. 1. Civ. P. 73(cX2) ("Each side shall have
the right to only one peremptory strike in any one case.*); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. SCR 3.815(5)(BXii)
(Banks-Baldwin 1999) ("Each side may have one peremptory strike.").
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contrast, juror selection procedures in the public courts generally
grant to the parties multiple peremptory strikes.0 0 Allowing only
one strike will make it more difficult in an arbitration proceeding for
the movant to demonstrate a pattern of strikes against potential
arbitrators sharing a similar protected characteristic.40 '
Our hope is that voluntary compliance with the statutory
prohibition itself will prevent many instances of discriminatory
selection. Moreover, we trust that attorneys in most cases will not
lie under oath about the reasons for their strike of a potential
arbitrator.4 2 In addition, the nature of arbitrator selection will
make it more difficult in many instances, as contrasted with a
Batson challenge in the context of juror selection, for the striking
party to mask a discriminatory strike with pretext. The lack of voir
dire (or any in-person contact with the potential arbitrator) prior to
the peremptory strike should prevent a party from striking an
arbitrator under such favorite pretexts as that the person's de-
meanor, body language or tone suggested hostility, lack of interest
4n See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 231 (West 2003) (providing for six peremptory
challenges for each party in civil case and up to twenty peremptory challenges each for
defendant and prosecution in criminal case); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-105 (2003) (allowing each
side twenty peremptory challenges in trial for offense punishable by death); LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. ANN. art. 1764 (West 2003) (providing for three peremptory challenges per side where
trial is by jury of six and six peremptory challenges per side if trial is by jury of twelve); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 546.10 (West 2000) ("Each party shall be entitled to two peremptory challenges,
which shall be made alternately beginning with the defendant."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2B:23-13
(West 2003) (providing each party in civil trial with six peremptory challenges and providing
parties in criminal trial between ten and twenty peremptory challenges).
401 The movant might try to demonstrate such a pattern over a series of cases by
examining the striking attorney. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965) (inference
of impermissible discrimination in juror selection would be raised by evidence that
the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances,
whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is
responsible for the removal ofNegroes who have been selected as qualified
jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for
cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve in petit juries),
overruled by Batson v. Kentucky 476 U.S. 79 (1986). But see Batson, 476 U.S. at 92 (noting
that "proofofrepeated striking of blacks over a number of cases... has placed on defendants
a crippling burden ofproof [with the result that) prosecutors' peremptory challenges are now
largely immune from constitutional scrutiny").
"'m See Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489,490 (Tex. 1991) (noting that attorney admitted
that race was factor in his exercise of peremptory strike against black juror).
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or forthrightness. 4 3  Moreover, the arbitral organization's pre-
qualification of the potential arbitrator will make it more difficult
for the striking party to assert convincingly a perceived lack of
competence as the justification for its strike.
Finally, the proposed statute grants to a court the power to
award costs to the moving party where the court finds that the
moving party has incurred costs because of the responding party's
discriminatory selection of an arbitrator.4 4 The proposed statute
also grants to a court the power to award costs to the responding
party where the court finds that the moving party filed its motion
with respect to arbitrator selection without probable cause. It is our
hope that the ability of a court to award these costs will discourage,
respectively, discriminatory selection of an arbitrator and frivolous
motions filed pursuant to this Section.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, the use of arbitration as a means to resolve
disputes has sharply increased. As arbitration is more frequently
utilized, the likelihood of invidious discrimination occurring in
arbitrator selection also increases. While some parties may consent
to selecting an arbitrator for particular reasons relating to cultural
issues pertinent to their dispute, more troublesome is the thought
that employers and businesses, who have greater knowledge about
and experience with the arbitral process, might gain control over the
arbitrator selection process through the use of invidious peremptory
strikes. Opponents of arbitration attempt to adapt existing legal
arguments to address this problem. Unfortunately, however,
3 See Exparte Bankhead, 625 So. 2d 1146, 1147-48 (Ala. 1993) (deeming that exclusion
of black veniremember because "he 'rubbed his face' in apparent disgust when the trial court
mentioned the possibility of sequestration" was suspect); Epps v. United States, 683 k2d 749,
753 (D.C. 1996) (sustaining trial judge's determination that counsel was not credible when
he explained his peremptory strikes of white veniremembers by referring to their "body
language"); Washington v. Kentucky, 34 S.W.3d 376, 379 (Ky. 2000) (holding that exclusion
of veniremember for "appearing inattentive or bored," among other reasons for exclusion,
could not withstand Batson challenge).
404 An instance where ordinarily it would not be appropriate for the court to award costs
to the moving party would be where the moving party expressly consented to the discrimina-
tion, but the arbitration award is nevertheless subject to vacatur because the basis for the
discrimination was not pertinent to a material issue in the case.
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neither the state action doctrine nor the use of the existing public
policy exception to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement or
arbitral award will be successful as a means to challenge the use of
discriminatory peremptory strikes.
A review of existing case law demonstrates that state action is
not present when a private litigant exercises a peremptory challenge
in either a court-ordered or contractual arbitral proceeding. A court
considering whether a litigant is a state actor when he strikes an
arbitrator for discriminatory reasons would quickly conclude that
the factors present in cases where state action is found-overt racial
discrimination, compulsion of jurors in a public setting or institu-
tional integrity of the courts-are simply not present when a litigant
exercises a peremptory challenge in the arbitral setting.
Moreover, existing case law does not support a court's refusal to
enforce an arbitration contract or award affected by discriminatory
arbitrator selection. The existing public policy exception for
enforcement of an arbitration contract or award is exceedingly
narrow and would extend to arbitrator selection only if the selection
process violated an explicit and well-defined public policy ascer-
tained through the law and legal precedents. While a well-defined
public policy does forbid the use of race and sex injury selection, no
similar public policy prohibits enforcement of an arbitration contract
or award involving the discriminatory selection of an arbitrator
because there is no established law or legislation related to discrimi-
natory arbitrator selection. In addition, the policies that militate
against discriminatory juror selection simply do not apply as
strongly in the context of arbitrator selection.
Thus, an amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act and the
Uniform Arbitration Act is the only means by which the problem of
discriminatory arbitrator selection may be addressed. We recom-
mend the adoption of the statute proposed in this Article to address
a problem that, if left unchecked, will continue to undermine the
arbitral process as well as the dispute resolution movement as a
whole.
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